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I. INTRODUCTION
Should appellate courts raise and decide issues that the parties have
not presented and argued? The Supreme Court often insists it will not
decide issues that have not been raised below.1 But the Supreme
Court—and lower appellate courts—frequently fall off the wagon.
In fact, some of the Supreme Court’s most famous opinions decided
issues not presented by the briefs or addressed below. In Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, the Court overturned sua sponte an ancient precedent on
applying the common law in diversity cases.2 Mapp v. Ohio overrules a
prior case and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the
states, without briefing or argument on the issue.3 In Washington v.
Davis, the Court decided that Title VII standards did not apply to
constitutional discrimination, even though the parties had agreed that
they did.4 Younger v. Harris prohibits injunctions against pending state

1. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 205 (2001).
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 81–90 (1938) (Butler, J., dissenting).
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3 (1961). Mapp overruled Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for
unreasonable searches and seizures to the states. According to the Court, that issue was
not raised by the appellant but was raised by amicus curiae, who was permitted to
participate in oral argument. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3. But see id. at 671 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the question was raised, albeit not argued). In dissent, Justice
Harlan emphasized that the issue had not been briefed or argued, the appellant’s counsel
had disclaimed overruling Wolf, and the amicus brief mentioned by the Court had only
raised the point in a paragraph. Id. at 672–74 & nn.4–6, 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the case should have been set for reargument after additional briefing).
4. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976).
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court criminal cases, even though the issue was not argued on appeal.5
Indeed, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Court held that due process requires
hearings and an opportunity to make submissions before a state can
terminate the parental rights of unwed fathers.6 But the Court decided
this without briefing or argument—without a hearing on the issue or an
opportunity for the parties to make submissions.7
What should happen when an appellate court looks at the briefs and
arguments presented by the parties and feels that the issue has not been
framed correctly? When appellate judges believe that a potentially
dispositive issue was missed by the parties, they have several options:
(1) they can ignore the issue;8 (2) they can spot the issue in their opinion,
but treat it as not properly raised or waived; (3) they can spot the issue
and remand it for resolution in the first instance in the trial court; (4)
they can ask the parties for supplemental briefs before deciding the
issue; (5) they can decide the issue without briefs; (6) they can spot the
issue in the opinion, and write dicta.
Courts make one of these six choices every day. But the Supreme
Court and other appellate courts have failed to follow any consistent
practice about sua sponte holdings.9 The difficulty courts have is
illustrated by the fact that even the most prominent appellate judges
sometimes say they want procedural regularity, but in other cases
exercise the freedom to do what they like. Some examples follow.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote: “As I have said before, ‘the
adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the
initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the
questions for review.’”10 But, he also wrote: “Notwithstanding the
5. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971).
6. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7. Id. at 659–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for raising the
due process issue sua sponte without briefing and argument).
8. Common sense tells us that appellate judges choose to ignore many issues that
have not been briefed. Most of the time, we cannot show it; the court will not record that
it has ignored issues. Cf. Letter from Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to the Chicago Council of Lawyers (Dec. 28, 1993)
(stating that the author would discuss issues not recognized by the parties and “say
outright what other judges prefer to keep under their hat”), quoted in Chicago Council of
Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 794–95 (1994). One set of decisions where we do know that the
Court ignored issues were those leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954). The implications of the decisions striking down aspects of de jure
segregation were clear for decades, but the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) avoided a frontal attack for many years. The Supreme Court,
in turn, avoided addressing the larger issues until 1954. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975).
9. See infra notes 128–66 and accompanying text.
10. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
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apparent waiver of the issue below, I believe that the Court should reach
the issue . . . because resolution of the question is so clearly antecedent
to disposition of this case.”11 In addition he wrote:
In these circumstances, although I suppose it is possible that reargument might
enable some of us to have a better informed view of a problem that has been
percolating in the courts for several years, I believe the Court acts wisely in
resolving the issue now on the basis of the arguments that have already been
fully presented without any special invitation from this Court.12

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote: “The premise of our adversarial system
is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry
and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and
argued by the parties before them.”13 Elsewhere, he said: “The rule that
points not argued will not be considered is more than just a prudential
rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases,
distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial
one.”14 But he also said: “[T]he refusal to consider arguments not raised
is a sound prudential practice, rather than a statutory or constitutional
mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates the contrary.”15 In
addition, Justice Scalia ruled that even if an issue is not pressed before it,

164, 194–95 n.4 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the desirability of ordering
supplemental briefing sua sponte concerning questionable precedent (quoting Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 623 (1988) (per curium) (Stevens, J., dissenting
from order directing reargument) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214, 1216
(1984) (dissenting from order directing reargument)))); see also Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 255–56 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing that the court sua
sponte applied different standards to constitutional discrimination than those applied by
Title VII).
11. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (dissenting from the Court’s refusal sua sponte to decide an issue that had
not been briefed or argued by the parties, although it had been raised by amici). Justice
Stevens continued: “On a number of occasions, this Court has considered issues waived
by the parties below and in the petition for certiorari because the issues were so integral
to decision of the case that they could be considered ‘fairly subsumed’ by the actual
questions presented.” Id. at 37.
12. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 110–11 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted) (overruling a prior constitutional precedent despite the fact that the
ground used by the Court had been specifically disclaimed by the petitioner; the ground
had been mentioned by the respondent and discussed by amici).
13. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
14. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia added that the rule is inapplicable if the parties agree to a basic, but wrong,
rule of law. Id.; see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
15. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the Supreme Court feels free to raise the issue if it was passed on below.16
Judge Richard Posner (then Chief Judge), criticized the opinion in
Hope Clinic v. Ryan,17 where the en banc majority invented a new federal
remedy sua sponte, and wrote:
The court . . . expand[s] federal judicial power over the states by a method that
the Supreme Court has never countenanced and that violates Article III of the
Constitution. It is a bone, incidentally, that the plaintiffs didn’t ask for; neither
side, in either case, requested this novel form of relief or commented on it in
their briefs. We are taking a leap into the unknown without any input from the
parties.18

On allowing a party to raise an issue for the first time at oral argument,
Judge Posner said: “[I]t would not be quite cricket of us to place
decision” on a ground not raised until the oral argument on appeal,
because the other party may have been lulled into presenting its case
differently.19 Similarly, Judge Posner has emphasized the importance of
waiver to the adversary system, writing:
Ours is an adversarial system; the judge looks to the parties to frame the issues
for trial and judgment. Our busy district judges do not have the time to play the
“proactive” role of a Continental European judge. True, they want to do justice
as well as merely umpire disputes, and they should not be criticized when they
point out to counsel a line of argument or inquiry that he has overlooked,
although they are not obliged to do so and (with immaterial exceptions) they
may not do so when an issue has been waived.20

16. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995).
17. 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), motion for stay of mandate denied by
equally divided court, 197 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacated by 530 U.S. 1271
(2000). In Hope Clinic, Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion sua sponte invented a
“precautionary injunction” against a state statute. That remedy preserved the statute’s
constitutionality by declaring some potential applications unconstitutional. Id. at 867–
70, 875.
18. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 876 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). For that matter,
compare Judge Easterbrook’s decision in Hope Clinic with his comments in Afterword:
On Being a Commercial Court:
I have also left out of the list [of praiseworthy qualities in judges] any
praise for judges who seize the moment to write essays about issues the parties
did not present. Just as parties may choose the terms of their contract, they
may choose the subjects of their litigation. Resolving a case on a ground not
presented denies the parties this autonomy and increases the risk that an
uninformed opinion will impede rather than promote commerce. It is hard
enough to navigate when the court sticks to questions fully ventilated by
counsel.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Afterword: On Being a Commercial Court, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
877, 880 (1989).
19. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay Hosp. Inc., 81 F.3d 53, 56 (7th
Cir. 1996). See also Hartmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir.
1993) (discussing why the court would not act sua sponte to undo a result the court
viewed as unjust); see infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text.
20. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see
also Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1259–60 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“I

1258

FINALMILLER.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1253, 2002]

2/3/2020 3:02 PM

Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

But Judge Posner also said: “Despite much pretense to the contrary by
judges and lawyers, it is one of the marks of the great judge to recast the
issues in cases in his own image rather than to assume a passive,
‘umpireal’ stance.”21
There are similar examples from many other judges, including Justices
White, Stewart, and O’Connor.22
wonder in what sense we can claim to have an adversarial system of justice if appellate
judges conceive their duty to be to search the record . . . for errors that the appellant’s
counsel missed, and to reverse if any are found. . . . But the adversarial system is the
system we have, and ad hoc modifications which cast an appellate judge . . . in the role
of juge d’instruction are unlikely to improve the system . . . .”).
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 144 (1990); see also
Lucien v. Johnson, 61 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that it is permissible to
reach an unbriefed issue because the court was sure the plaintiff had no claim); Chicago
Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 795–96 (criticizing the opinion in Marrese v. Am.
Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated and replaced en
banc, 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983), aff’d en banc, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d,
470 U.S. 373 (1985) (deciding the antitrust issue on the merits in an appeal of a
discovery order)).
22. Justice White: compare Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971) (“In this
posture of the case, the question, although briefed and argued here, is not properly before
us.”), and City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 130 (1981) (White, J., concurring
in judgment) (“I much prefer as a matter of policy and common sense to answer the
question for which we took the case.”), with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 n.10
(1972) (stating that it was proper for the Court to apply a theory not raised or briefed by
the parties because the “method of analysis [was] readily available to the state court”).
Justice Stewart: compare United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 696–97 (1975)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for deciding sua sponte an issue raised by a
pending petition for certiorari in another matter, but not briefed or argued in the current
case), and Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 631 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for deciding an issue not contained in the petition for certiorari or
the briefs, and raised only tangentially in oral argument), with Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S.
407, 430 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion by Justice
Stewart for providing a remedy that had not been requested by any party).
Justice O’Connor: compare Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 67–68
(1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (disagreeing with the Court’s decision of
the ripeness issue that was not considered below and was briefed only in passing), with
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 540 (1999) (O’Connor, J.) (approving
consideration of issues waived by the parties below and in certiorari petition because
they were essential to consideration of the case), and id. at 552–53 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (complaining that the issue discussed by Court was not briefed by the parties
because they agreed the issue was not before the Court).
For other examples, see Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. §
3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1045 n.88 (1998) (citing inconsistent
positions taken by Judge Lawrence Silberman) and Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 880.
Even the Supreme Court Rules reflect this tension. Rule 24(1)(a) provides that the
merits brief may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions
presented in the writ of certiorari or jurisdictional statement. SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(a). At
the same time, Rule 24(1)(a) provides: “At its option, however, the Court may consider a
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Although the concern has been largely unstated, sua sponte decisions
trouble judges because due process interests are implicated when a court
recasts the questions presented and decides a case on issues not
discussed by the parties without remanding or providing an opportunity
for briefing. The fundamental core of due process is that a party should
have notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a claim is
decided.23 The adversary system is based on the premise that allowing
the parties to address the court on the decisive issue increases the
accuracy of the decision. In addition, it increases the parties’ sense that
the court’s process and result are fair.24
In 1997, the Supreme Court indicated a preference, but not a
requirement, for requesting supplemental briefing when a court raises a
new issue sua sponte.25 But the Supreme Court has never squarely
decided whether due process prevents an appellate court from raising
new issues without giving the parties a chance to be heard. As far back
as 1940, the Court accepted certiorari on the question of whether an
appellate court could decide a case “on a point not presented or argued
by the litigants, which the petitioner had never had an opportunity to
meet by the production of evidence.”26 That case was decided, however,
on other grounds.
The absence of a consistent principle leaves courts open to the
accusation that ignoring the adversary process is a political action, where
a court reaches out to legislate instead of following judicial norms.27 But
plain error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise
within its jurisdiction to decide.” Id.; see also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,
205 (2001) (stating that Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) limits certiorari to the issue
presented). See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Deciding What to Decide: The Judges’
Bill at 75, 84 JUDICATURE 120, 124–27 (2000) (discussing how the Court’s
implementation of certiorari to limit review to particular issues is contrary to the original
understanding that certiorari review would bring up the entire case).
23. See, e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 465–68 (2000) (stating
that the trial court could not enter a judgment against a new party on an amended claim
without giving the party time to respond and an opportunity to be heard); Lachance v.
Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998); see also, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10
(2000) (suggesting that due process required the Florida Supreme Court to provide the
“opportunity for argument” before it created a statewide standard for manual recounts in
the presidential election).
24. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); see also infra notes
54–58 and accompanying text.
25. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 92 (1997) (declining to decide whether the
Fifth Circuit was permitted to raise an issue in a habeas case sua sponte, but expressing
preference in dicta for supplemental briefing).
26. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 416 (1940).
27. See Rosemary Krimbel, Note, Rehearing Sua Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Procedure for Judicial Policymaking, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 919, 919–20 & n.6, 942–43
(1989) (criticizing the sua sponte Supreme Court rehearings as raising countermajoritarian
difficulty and possibly violating case and controversy requirement (citing KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 3–7, 29–33 (1960))).
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raising and deciding new issues is by no means limited to any one part of
the political spectrum. Liberal and conservative judges alike decide new
issues sua sponte; each side complains when the other does it.28
There are four serious questions at stake: First, why do appellate
courts have so much trouble taking consistent positions on waiver and
raising issues sua sponte? Second, when are parties entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard before an appellate court decides an
issue? Third, what should appellate courts do if they believe that the
right issue governing the case has not been raised, and they want to raise
it sua sponte? Fourth, under what substantive circumstances should
courts raise issues sua sponte, and when should they treat the issue as
waived?
Although these questions raise fundamental concerns about the role of
appellate courts, the adversary system, and due process, they have
received surprisingly little attention.29 This Article explores the
28. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Harlan, Stewart, Marshall, and O’Connor have
all criticized sua sponte decisionmaking. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S.
43, 67–68 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (disagreeing with the Court’s
decision of the ripeness issue that was not considered below and was briefed only in
passing); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 522–23 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for deciding an issue that was not litigated or briefed below, and not
argued in response to the question presented by the Court); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S.
671, 696–97 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (deciding a criminal case); Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 631 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (pertaining to a grand jury
proceeding); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659–61 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for raising a due process issue sua sponte without briefing and
argument); Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. El Paso Nat’l Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464, 473–76
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for enforcing the Court’s prior mandate
sua sponte and without full briefing and argument when the parties had settled, and
claiming that the Court’s desire to “do justice” was improper); Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S.
234, 246–48 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that the Court decided
the case on an issue that was missed below and not contained in the petition for certiorari).
29. Professor Robert Martineau wrote an entertaining article on a closely related
subject: what an appellate court should do when a party tries to raise a new issue. Robert J.
Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1023 (1987). Professor Martineau’s article has been cited both for its merits
and for its citation to the work of Gary Larson. Id. at 1057 n.137. See also Richard V.
Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised
and Preserved (pts I–III), 7 WIS. L. REV. 91, 160 (1932), 8 WIS. L. REV. 147 (1933); Allan
D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477
(1958–59); Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise
New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985 (1989); Miller, supra note 22, at 1049–51; David
William Navarro, Comment, Jury Interrogatories and the Preservation of Error in Federal
Civil Cases: Should the Plain-Error Doctrine Apply?, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1163 (1999);
Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, What Issues Will the Supreme Court Consider, Though
Not, or Not Properly, Raised by the Parties, 42 L. Ed. 2d 946 (1976).
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questions raised by sua sponte dispositions in civil cases.30 Part II
explores how the age-old tension between law and equity is the source of
much confusion by the courts. Part III discusses the “adversary process
model” of litigation, and shows its relationship to the waiver doctrine.
Part IV discusses how the courts’ desire to do equity leads both to sua
sponte decisions and to unpredictability in the courts’ decisionmaking.
Part V explores whether sua sponte appellate decisions of unbriefed
issues violate due process. Part VI proposes that appellate courts should
give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard when they raise an
issue sua sponte. Part VII concludes with suggestions on the most
difficult problem—when a court should raise new issues sua sponte.
II. WHY COURTS ARE INCONSISTENT: THE UNRESOLVED TENSION
BETWEEN LAW AND EQUITY
Courts are confused about the power to raise and decide issues sua
sponte because our appellate system embraces two conflicting historical
ideas about adjudication. The first is the idea of the adversary process;
the second is the courts’ desire to see that justice is done.31 The first
model assumes a court is an umpire who calls balls and strikes; the
second expects judges to step in to prevent injustices occurring before
their eyes.32
30. Because the policy considerations and rules governing criminal cases are
different, this Article will focus on civil cases (though some of the governing Supreme
Court rules derive from criminal and habeas cases). The role of a court to intervene to
assure that justice is done is arguably stronger in a criminal case. This may underlie the
recognition of the broader scope of the plain error doctrine in criminal cases. See, e.g.,
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 436–43 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the scope of the court’s powers to act sua sponte in criminal cases); Derrick
Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation of Error Requirement
in Criminal Cases, 46 KAN. L. REV. 947 (1998); Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty
States: Some Appellants’ Equal Protection Is More Equal than Others’, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 625, 639–41 (1996) (discussing the scope of the court’s obligation to find issues
sua sponte when counsel wishes to withdraw in a criminal appeal). Plain error is not
always recognized as a ground for review in civil cases. See infra notes 50–52 and
accompanying text.
31. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1026–28; Krimbel, supra note 27, at 941 (stating
that “control of the issues by the litigants is central to our adversarial system of law”).
32. This tension is illustrated by an oft-told anecdote from Judge Learned Hand:
[Holmes] was to me the master craftsman certainly of our time; and he said: “I
hate justice,” which he didn’t quite mean. What he did mean was this. I
remember once I was with him; it was a Saturday when the Court was to
confer. It was before we had a motor car, and we jogged along in an old
coupé. When we got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so
as he walked off, I said to him: “Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!” He turned
quite sharply and he said: “Come here. Come here.” I answered: “Oh, I know,
I know.” He replied: “That is not my job. My job is to play the game
according to the rules.”
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The conflict is a byproduct of the merger of law and equity. In the old
English law courts, lower courts addressed cases brought under specific
pleading rules, or forms of action. Appellate courts did not review trial
court decisions de novo, but instead entertained a “writ of error.” The
writ evolved from an independent action against the trial judge or jury
for a false judgment or verdict.33 A writ of error was required to
“assign” specific issues in which the trial court made an error under
existing precedent or analogies to that precedent.34 The appellate court’s
job was to determine if an error occurred, not to substitute its judgment
as to who should prevail on the merits. Appellate courts were not free to
raise new issues sua sponte; issues not assigned as error were waived.35
At the same time, English equity courts decided cases not fitting
within the existing rules of law.36 Equity courts dispensed justice that fit
the facts of the case, within general rules. Appellate courts in equity
were free to consider any issue de novo, whether an issue of law or
fact.37 Unlike the law courts, equity developed flexible procedures to
address the needs of individual cases. One of those procedures was the
device of rehearing, which allowed the court to address new facts or law
not originally raised by the parties. A showing of legal error was not
Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111, 146
(1996) (alteration in original) (quoting LEARNED HAND, A Personal Confession, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 302, 306–07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960)). Professor Herz’s
essay explores the political uses to which this anecdote has been put as well as the
tension between concepts of law and justice.
33. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1026; Dennerline, supra note 29, at 985–86.
34. The Supreme Court’s original appellate jurisdiction was by writ of error. See
Krimbel, supra note 27, at 924 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §25, 1 Stat. 73,
85–86 (1789)). Certiorari review was not introduced until 1891. Id. at 925 (citing
Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)).
35. Because the appellate court was limited to assigned issues, it could rule only
on questions reflected in the record, for that was the only basis to determine the lower
court’s rulings. At the time, the record consisted of documents filed in court. Since verbatim
transcripts were not kept, a party could ask the judge or a third party to record in writing
the action or inaction of the judge and the party’s exception to the ruling. This bill of
exceptions became the basis for the appeal. See generally Martineau, supra note 29, at
1026–27; Dennerline, supra note 29, at 986; Krimbel, supra note 27, at 924, 927–30.
36. Krimbel, supra note 27, at 928 (“[E]quity exists for circumstances ‘wherein
the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.’” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (1765))).
37. Martineau, supra note 29, at 1027 (stating that the “appellate court could
review the entire case, both law and facts, and render any type of judgment it thought
justice demanded, without regard to whether the issue upon which the appellate court
based its judgment had been presented to the lower court”); Dennerline, supra note 29, at
986.
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required for a rehearing in equity.38
Federal courts (and most state courts) long ago merged law and
equity. One set of appellate courts administers both systems.39
Nevertheless, American appellate procedures are overtly based on the
principles of writ of error review at common law, rather than the appeal
in equity.40 Some commentators, prominently including Dean Roscoe
Pound, have criticized this choice, saying that focusing on error limits
the courts’ proper concern for justice.41 In spite of criticism, the writ of
error approach, with its emphasis on the adversary process, remains the
dominant theory of appellate review.42 Under the surface, the historic
tensions underlying law and equity persist, and still compete in the
workings of appellate courts.43
III. PROCEDURAL REGULARITY: THE ADVERSARY PROCESS MODEL
The adversary process model of appeal brings with it a set of
procedural principles that derive from the writ of error and underlie the
conventional role of appellate courts.
A. The “General Rule”: Appellate Courts Only Consider Issues
Raised by the Parties
1. Appellate Courts Will Not Consider Issues Not Raised in
the Trial Court
What Professor Robert Martineau refers to as the “general rule”44 was
stated by the Supreme Court in Singleton v. Wulff:45 “It is the general
rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue

38. See Krimbel, supra note 27, at 927–30.
39. See id. at 927.
40. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1027–28; see also Edson R. Sunderland,
Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REV. 3, 7–8 (1940) (“To this day . . .
we employ formal assignments of error because six hundred years ago the judge was
held to be entitled to know what were the charges against him . . . .”).
41. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1027–28 (citing ROSCOE POUND,
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 107–10, 318–20 (1941)); Sunderland, supra
note 40, at 7–8. The idea that law should be about justice and not rules was a theme of
the legal realists. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1028 (citing ROSCOE POUND,
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 107–10, 318–20, 374–76 (1941)). See
generally Sunderland, supra note 40.
42. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1028.
43. See, e.g., Krimbel, supra note 27, at 930 (commenting that the equitable
decision to rehear a case does not follow from common law and may proceed from
concepts as varied as “fairness,” “moral good,” and “justice”).
44. Martineau, supra note 29.
45. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
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not passed upon below.”46 Several provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require that issues be raised in the trial court, or they
will be treated as waived.47 Even if a party briefs and argues a question
in the appellate court, it will be considered waived if not argued below.48
Further, an issue must have been presented in a timely fashion below; if
presented too late to the trial court, it is waived.49
Another formulation of the waiver doctrine is that there is no plain
error review available in civil cases.50 This differs from criminal
46. Id. at 120; accord Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001); see
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1023, 1044.
It is a long-standing rule that, in order to be reviewable on appeal, a claim or
issue must have been “pressed or passed upon below.” The reason for such a
rule is obvious: “[analyzing] the facts of a particular [issue] without the benefit
of a full record or lower court determination is not a sensible exercise.” A
claim or an issue is “pressed or passed upon below” when it fairly appears in
the record as having been raised or decided.
19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 205.05[1], at 205–55 (3d
ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538
(1992) (quoting Lytle v. Householf Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552 n.3 (1990))); accord
ROBERT STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 344 (7th ed. 1993) (collecting
cases); 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4036,
at 9–10 (2002) (collecting cases).
After stating the general rule, the Court in Singleton proceeded to say there is “no
general rule.” Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121; see also Martineau, supra note 29, at 1023,
1044; infra notes 122–27 and accompanying text.
47. These include Rule 12(h), FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (stating that certain defenses
waived if not raised at first opportunity), Rule 46, FED. R. CIV. P. 46 (stating that party
must advise trial court of action requested and grounds therefor), and Rule 51, FED. R.
CIV. P. 51 (stating that party must raise issues by instructions and objections).
48. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001)
(remanding the case because the parties had raised an issue not presented below); Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971) (deciding a criminal case); Martineau, supra note
29, at 1028–29. But see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (deciding the case on a
ground raised sua sponte by the Court); id. at 659–60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (pointing
out that Justice White wrote flatly inconsistent majority opinions for the Court in Stanley
and in Hill).
49. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 51 (requiring a timely objection to jury instruction);
Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 903 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (stating that a claim for
false arrest was not raised until after the judgment was waived, even though the facts
were pleaded in the complaint); Carter, supra note 30, at 947. An issue can also be
presented too early to the trial court. See Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 566–67 (7th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (deciding that when the trial judge makes the conditional or the
tentative ruling on the pretrial objection, the party must renew the objection during trial
to preserve the position for appeal).
50. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 276–77 & 276 n.7
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carter v. Chicago Police Officers, 165 F.3d 1071,
1077–78 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no civil plain error for jury instructions); Hartmann v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207, 1216 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., concurring in
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procedure, where appellate reversal for plain error is included in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure51 and is necessary to protect
defendants’ rights. As a logical matter, the absence of review for plain
error is the flip side of the waiver rule; allowing plain error review
would relieve parties of the consequences of their waivers.52
2. Arguments Not Raised in the Briefs Are Usually Treated as Waived
Similarly, issues must be briefed in the appellate court or they will be
treated as waived.53 The policy underlying that rule overlaps the policy
in Singleton requiring that issues be raised in the trial court—it wouldn’t
be fair to decide cases on issues where the parties had no opportunity to
introduce evidence or make their best arguments. As Justice Scalia (then
Circuit Judge) wrote: “The premise of our adversarial system is that
appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and
research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and
argued by the parties before them.”54
3. Justifications for the General Rule of Waiver
In Singleton, the Court gave three reasons for the general rule. First,
the waiver rule makes it more likely the parties will offer all the
evidence they believe relevant to the issues; if a party does not know an
issue will be decided, it may choose not to offer evidence.55 Second, it
prevents the court from making an uninformed decision, because the
part and dissenting in part); Kensington Rock Island Ltd. P’ship. v. Am. Eagle Historic
Partners, 921 F.2d 122, 125 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990); Dillipaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.,
322 A.2d 114, 177 (Pa. 1974) (abolishing the plain error rule in civil cases); see also
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1052–55 (arguing strongly that the rationale of the plain
error rule does not apply to civil cases because waiver concerns are present and because
the integrity of justice concerns present in criminal cases are usually absent).
51. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30, and FED. R. CIV. P. 52, with FED. R. CIV. P. 46,
and FED. R. CIV. P. 51, and FED. R. CIV. P. 61. See generally 9A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2558, at 468–69
(1995).
52. Plain error review is only available when errors have been waived. If the error
has been asserted below, no waiver has occurred. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1040
(arguing that if the plain error had been pointed out to the trial court, it would have in
many cases reached the other result (because the error was so plain), obviating the need
for appeal).
53. Examples of such rulings are discussed infra notes 70–83 and accompanying
text.
54. See, e.g., Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983); cf. Lebron v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 408 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating
that the waiver rules rest upon a limited view of judicial power).
55. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). A trial court may also preclude
the introduction of evidence if an issue has not been raised.
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court has no idea what evidence the party might have offered if it had
been given an opportunity.56 Third, as a matter of fairness, parties
should have the opportunity to present legal arguments on the issue
decided.57 As noted above, there is a sense that “it would not be quite
cricket” to place decision on a ground not raised until the oral argument
on appeal, because the other party may have been lulled into presenting
its case differently.58
In addition to the adversary process, the waiver rule has been
justified by the need for efficiency: waiver rules mean that the trial
court’s effort is not wasted. They also allow an appellate court to
dispose of a case immediately—without more briefing, arguments, or
remands. In a time when courts complain about their dockets, this is
an important factor.59

56. Id.; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329–30 & 329 n.8 (1989)
(discussing the importance of notice and opportunity for argument prior to ruling on a
dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and reserving ruling on propriety of trial court sua
sponte dismissals under that rule).
57. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120; see also Schopler, supra note 29, at 949. For other
reasons for the general rule, see Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 720–21
(10th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases); Carter, supra note 30, at 950; Martineau, supra note
29, at 1028–34; Dennerline, supra note 29, at 986–88; Vestal, supra note 29, at 487–95.
58. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay Hosp., Inc., 81 F.3d 53, 56 (7th
Cir. 1996); see Miller, supra note 22, at 1050.
59. As Professor Martineau noted, waiver rules derive from the premise that rules of
procedure are necessary to a final resolution of a dispute. Waiver rules require parties to
assert their rights and positions at the first opportunity. Otherwise, parties can benefit from
their own inaction, and cases may never end. Martineau, supra note 29, at 1030–31. The
general rule prevents parties from inviting alleged error in the trial court (taking a chance
they would win on another ground) and reversing their position in the appellate court (to
make sure they would win on the ground where error had been invited). See Michelle
Lawner, Comment, Why Federal Courts Should Be Required to Consider State
Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1282–86, 1283 n.124 (1999)
(citing Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393–98 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
The Tenth Circuit in Lyons also identified a number of ways in which concerns of
waiver can arise:
One is a bald-faced new issue. Another is a situation where a litigant changes
to a new theory on appeal that falls under the same general category as an
argument presented at trial. A third is a theory that was discussed in a vague
and ambiguous way. A fourth is issues that were raised and then abandoned
pre-trial. A fifth is an issue raised for the first time in an untimely motion.
These are all different aspects of the same principle that issues not passed upon
below will not be considered on appeal.
Lyons, 994 F.3d at 722.
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4. Expansion of the Waiver Doctrine
Courts have expanded waiver in recent years.60 Courts now treat as
waived even issues that were raised in the briefs, because they were not
briefed with sufficient detail.61 Arguments in footnotes,62 of just one
page or less,63 without citation of authority,64 incorporating briefs
presented below,65 or presented for the first time in reply briefs66 or oral
argument67 have been rejected.68 Even claims of waiver have been
deemed waived because they were not raised at the first possible time.69
60. Perhaps this is a response to perceptions of court crowding or a reaction to
judicial activism. Courts hearing civil cases may also have been influenced by the
rulings in postconviction cases that prisoners cannot challenge their convictions if issues
were not raised in their direct appeals. See, e.g., Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131
(1987); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486 (1986).
61. See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 172–73 (1958); JTC
Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 780–81 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating
that a novel theory was waived because it was insufficiently developed); Karibian v.
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the issue was raised
but not sufficiently developed); see also Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d
225, 230 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a party loses if the brief fails to “make a minimally
complete and comprehensible argument” for each claim, regardless of the claim’s
merits).
62. See Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 441–42 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that a
contention is waived when it is asserted for the first time in a footnote in a reply brief).
63. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1480 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating
that an issue that is stated but not argued is waived); Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332,
1342 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that an issue that is stated in a single paragraph is waived);
L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating that an argument raised in one page without authority is waived); Leer v.
Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that an issue is abandoned if it is
raised but not supported by argument).
64. See Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 726–27 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating that an argument that is unsupported by pertinent authority is waived); Mathis v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that even a pro se
litigant must file an argument citing supporting authority); LINC Fin. Corp. v.
Onwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 921–22 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the failure to cite
authority constitutes a waiver); In re Maurice, 21 F.3d 767, 774–75 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the court will not do a party’s legal research).
65. See Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 141 F.3d 728, 740 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that
the court will not consider an argument if it refers to arguments presented to the district
court).
66. See, e.g., Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 597 (7th Cir.
1997).
67. See Frobose v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 612–13 (7th
Cir. 1998); Bank of Illinois v. Over, 65 F.3d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (stating
that a claim that discovery cutoff prevented the plaintiff from proving that the
defendants’ employees knowingly placed a child whom was beaten in danger was
waived because it was not raised in the brief).
68. The severity of the rule that arguments are waived if not properly developed is
heightened by increasing insistence that parties adhere to strict page limits. See Chicago
Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 703–05.
69. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.); In
re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 1999)
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B. Under the Adversary Process Model, Waiver Can
Lead to Harsh Results
But strict enforcement of waiver rules can lead to very harsh results.
Three Seventh Circuit cases illustrate this point. In each case, the facts
were before the court, but the correct legal doctrine had not been argued.
Two are discrimination cases, where plaintiffs with potentially
meritorious claims lost because their lawyers advanced the wrong
theory. In Sanders v. Village of Dixmoor,70 a police officer was
suspended by a new police chief with the words, “Nigger, you’re
suspended.”71 The court ruled that the plaintiff’s discrimination claim
had been waived because it had been erroneously argued as a harassment
claim.72 In DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co.,73 a female lineman
challenged her company’s practice of failing to provide a restroom for
her to use during work performed outdoors. The court ruled that her
disparate impact claim was waived because she had only argued sexual
harassment.74
A classic case of the harshness of waiver—with a result even the court
handing down the decision viewed as unjust on the merits—is Judge
Posner’s opinion in Hartmann v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America.75
In Hartmann, the court applied the waiver rule against orphans whose
stepmother killed their father after bribing an insurance agent to defraud
the orphans. The orphans sued for fraud and equitable reformation of
the policies.76 There was no question of guilt—the wife and insurance
agent were convicted of mail fraud in connection with the murder.77 The
Seventh Circuit held that the court could not grant reformation of the
contract, but that fraud damages were theoretically available. In oral
(Posner, C.J.). In recent years, courts have been willing to raise sua sponte procedural
defaults in habeas cases even if the state has waived the argument by failing to raise it.
See, e.g., Kurzawa v. Jordan, 146 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 1998); Magouirk v. Phillips,
144 F.3d 348, 357–60 (5th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); see also Calderon v. Thompson,
523 U.S. 538, 547–49 (1998) (discussing the sua sponte recall of mandates in habeas
cases).
70. 178 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1999).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 870.
73. 223 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.).
74. Id. at 436–37. A dissent by Judge Rovner disagreed with the court’s sexual
harassment ruling but did not challenge the waiver holding. Id. at 437–40.
75. 9 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993).
76. Id. at 1208–09.
77. See United States v. Hartmann, 958 F.2d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1992).

1269

FINALMILLER.DOC

2/3/2020 3:02 PM

argument, however, the plaintiffs’ lawyer said—incorrectly—that
reformation was required before damages were available.78 Because the
plaintiffs’ lawyer did not argue the correct grounds, the Seventh Circuit
applied waiver and refused to reach the correct result sua sponte.79 In
discussing the applicable policies, Judge Posner wrote:
We are not happy with this result. This is a sympathetic case for the plaintiffs.
But we cannot have a rule that in a sympathetic case an appellant can serve us
up a muddle in the hope that we or our law clerks will find somewhere in it a
reversible error. One consequence of such an approach would be that prudent
appellees would have to brief issues not raised or pressed by appellants lest the
appellate court fasten on such a (non)issue and use it to upend the judgment of
the trial court. So briefs would be even longer than they are, and their focus
even more diffuse. Another consequence would be to diminish the responsibility of
lawyers and to reduce competition among them, since the court would tend to
side with the weaker counsel even more than it does anyway, at least when his
was the more appealing case. Our system unlike that of the Continent is not
geared to having judges take over the function of lawyers, even when the result
would be to rescue clients from their lawyers’ mistakes. The remedy, if any, for
the questionable tactical decisions apparently made by the plaintiffs’ counsel in
this case lies elsewhere.80

After explaining why the adversary process model requires waiver,
Judge Posner acknowledged that courts sometimes have not followed
that model, but explained why those cases were different:
It is true that courts sometimes relieve parties from the consequences of their
waivers, even if the case does not fall within one of the established exceptions
such as those for issues of jurisdiction or comity. We did that in a recent case
where the defendant had waived an issue in the district court, but it was a pure
issue of law fully briefed in our court and we could find “no reason to defer its
resolution to another case. There will be no better time to resolve the issue than
now.” This is not such a case. Nor is it a case . . . where a court decides to
reexamine a precedent so deeply entrenched in the law that a litigant might not
think to challenge it . . . .81

Judge Posner concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief
from the waiver rule in Hartmann because the lawyer had told the
78.
79.

Hartmann, 9 F.3d at 1213–14.
The court stated:
We would not be disposed to hold the plaintiffs’ lawyer to a concession
made in the distracting atmosphere of an oral argument. But we have searched
his briefs in this court in vain for any hint of an argument that the fraud case
against Loochtan and Debra can survive the dismissal of the claim against
Prudential. There is nothing. This is a case neither of a ground abandoned in
the district court and sought to be revived here, nor of a ground pressed in the
district court and abandoned here—and either would be a case of waiver.
Id. at 1214. Chief Judge Posner added that the plaintiffs’ counsel had his arguments
“backwards.” Id.
80. Id. at 1214–15. Judge Cudahy dissented in part, preferring to apply a different
agency rule. He grudgingly accepted, however, that the plaintiffs had waived the fraud
claim. Id. at 1215–16.
81. Id. at 1214–15 (citations omitted).
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appellate court he was not advancing what later proved to be the correct
theory, “but the court’s independent research and reflection persuade the
court that the lawyer is wrong.”82 The plaintiffs were bound by their
lawyers’ mistake because: “If reversal on such grounds is proper, we no
longer have an adversary system of justice in the federal courts.”83
Hartmann cries out for a different result. If there were ever a case
where a strict application of waiver in private litigation seems
inappropriate on its facts, it would seem to be a case involving orphans
(whose father’s killing was arranged by their stepmother) suing an
insurance company whose agent had been bribed. The Hartmann judges
seemed to share this view, but felt bound by doctrine. What else could
they have done?
IV. DOING JUSTICE, REGARDLESS OF THE PROCEDURAL STATUS
A. The Tradition of Equity and the Federal Courts
Because judges also see their role as doing justice in the tradition of
equity (or at least avoiding miscarriages of justice), courts frequently
refuse to apply the waiver rule and instead raise issues sua sponte. This
theory of the judicial role is also consistent with portions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The original theory of the Federal Rules was to create a more flexible
system of justice. Many provisions were deliberately designed to abolish the
old forms of action and “theory of the pleadings” approaches of the
English law courts.84 These provisions include Rule 15(b), allowing
liberal amendments to conform to the evidence, even at or after trial, and
Rule 54(c), allowing a court to “grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in the party’s pleadings.”85 Rules 15(b) and 54(c) are in
82. Id. at 1215.
83. Id. Judge Cudahy dissented in part, seeing no reason not to apply an agency
rule contrary to that applied by the court because it was supported by prior precedent.
He grudgingly accepted, however, that the plaintiffs had waived the fraud claim. Id. at
1215–16.
84. See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1219, at 188–95 (2d ed. 1990). Federal Rules “make[] it
very plain that the theory of the pleadings mentality has no place under federal practice.”
Id. at 190.
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 authorizes the courts of
appeals to reach a result that is just under the circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000).
This has been used as justification in exceptional circumstances for bypassing the waiver
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tension with strict application of waiver law and stand for an opposing
principle—the courts’ desire to reach justice on the merits.86
The adoption of the Federal Rules was followed by decisions
endorsing the equity model. A good example is Justice Black’s opinion
for the Court in Hormel v. Helvering.87 There, the Court approved
consideration of an issue not squarely presented before a trial court:
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not
to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under
which courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances decline to
consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged would
be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly rules of procedure do not require
sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice.88

This desire for justice was recently restated by Justice Stevens. In
Carlisle v. United States, he wrote that a judge is “more than a referee
whose authority is limited to granting or denying motions advanced by
the parties.”89 Quoting Learned Hand, he noted that a “judge, at least in
a federal court, is more than a moderator; he is affirmatively charged
with securing a fair trial, and he must intervene sua sponte to that end,
when necessary.”90 Justice Stevens explained that every court of justice
has a power “to correct that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of
its process.”91
B. The Tension Between Doing Justice for the Parties and Stating
Broad Rules for Future Cases
In addition, courts are influenced by another dichotomy—the tension
between deciding cases principally for the parties and the view that
appellate courts should issue opinions that state broad rules of general
applicability that will guide future conduct. Both the desire to do justice
and the idea of setting forth broad rules can lead judges to go beyond the
issues presented by the adversary process.
rule. See Mitchell J. Waldman, Annotation, When Will Federal Court of Appeals Review
Issue Raised by Party for First Time on Appeal Where Legal Developments After Trial
Affect Issue, 76 A.L.R. FED. 522, 525 (1986).
86. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1030–31 (noting that justice requires a system
of rules that the parties must obey).
87. 312 U.S. 552 (1941).
88. Id. at 557. See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 993–94; see also Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 246–47 n.12 (1981) (“We may consider questions outside
the scope of the . . . order [granting review] when resolution of those questions is
necessary for the proper disposition of the case.”).
89. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 437 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (quoting Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799 (2d Cir. 1933)).
91. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Arkadelphia Co. v.
St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134, 146 (1919)). Although the quote discusses a trial
court’s power in a criminal case, the broad statement of principle was not so limited.
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The adversary process model is focused on doing justice for the
parties before the court. As Justice Ginsburg (then Judge) wrote: “First,
courts strive to ‘get it right’—to reach a correct result in the case at
hand.”92 This is undoubtedly the view of almost all litigants.93
As discussed above, within this focus the tension between enforcing
procedural norms and doing justice leads courts to sometimes find
injustice and to raise issues sua sponte. But appellate courts are also
affected by the view that their job is to provide broad rules for future
cases.94 Focusing on judicial economy or the need to guide litigants in
their conduct, courts will sometimes discuss issues that are not ripe, by
strict procedural standards.95 Judge Posner expressed this view in his
book about Justice Cardozo:
It was a good point, well worth making, and more useful for the guidance of
bench and bar than an interpretation of a particular contract. Legal craft values
in a traditional sense that emphasizes meticulous accuracy and an unwavering
duty to place decision on the narrowest possible ground are here compromised
in pursuit of a larger sense of judicial responsibility.96

1. Relaxing Procedural Rules to Decide Important Issues
The disregard of procedural limits to articulate broad guidelines for
future conduct is illustrated in several different types of cases. It can be
seen in cases that present issues that, while not raised sua sponte, would
normally not be reached because they were not necessary to the
decision.97 In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.

92. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205,
206 (1985).
93. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 684–85; Krimbel, supra note
27, at 930.
94. See Hartnett, supra note 22, at 124–27; Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of
Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126–27 (1999) (arguing that
the judicial function is to decide cases by issuing judgments).
95. Getting an issue right in the abstract is not necessarily the same as getting it
right for the litigants in the case. The author always becomes nervous when reading that
an opinion has “simplified” the facts. See, e.g., Fischbein v. First Chi. NBD Corp., 161
F.3d 1104, 1104 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) (“The facts are not in dispute, and we
offer an abbreviated and simplified summary.”). Cases are won or lost on those little
facts. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 799.
96. POSNER, supra note 21, at 107.
97. For an unconvincing defense of deciding issues unnecessary to the decision,
see John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999).
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Sullivan,98 for example, the Supreme Court held that there was no state
action, so 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was inapplicable. The Court nevertheless
reached the merits of a Due Process Clause issue. The Court reasoned
that it had granted review of the question, and added: “This question has
been briefed and argued, it is an important one, and it is squarely
presented for review. We thus proceed to address it.”99
A similar situation arises where the issue was not preserved but the
Court nevertheless decides it. In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc.,100 the Court acknowledged that the petitioner had failed to preserve
an issue below by failing to make a timely objection. The Court decided
the issue because it was novel and important, had been briefed by the
parties, and had been decided by the district court as an alternate
holding. The Court decided that it would further efficient judicial
administration to decide the issue.101 The desire to issue a broad rule
often influences courts to abandon traditional procedural norms and
instead to reach out and decide issues not presented by a case or argued
by the parties.102
2. Obiter Dicta
The desire to guide future conduct also leads to obiter dicta, where a
court reaches out to express an opinion on issues not before it. In many
cases, judges will spot an issue that has not been briefed, piously refuse
to decide it, but then express an opinion. Courts write what they know
to be dicta to express their views on unbriefed issues.
Authors of separate opinions frequently criticize unbriefed dicta.103
98. 526 U.S. 40, 50–51 (1999).
99. Id. at 59; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980) (stating that the
Court would consider a question that was fully briefed, important, recurring, and was
pending in another certiorari petition, despite the fact that the question had not been
presented below).
100. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
101. Id. 255–57. Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the issue was
waived. Id. at 271–79 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Martineau, supra note 29, at
1040–41 (arguing that if the issue is going to come up in another case anyway, there is
no need to reward a party that waived it).
102. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 685; see also Krimbel, supra
note 27, at 930 (noting the tension between a rehearing sua sponte and the goal of
attaining justice for particular litigants).
103. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 221
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court should not pass on the important
question of federalism that was not briefed or argued, even in dicta); United States Dep’t
of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 736–37 (1990) (Brennan, J., separate statement)
(stating that a court should not sua sponte and without briefs and arguments address a
standing issue that is not necessary to the result); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
257 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago,
45 F.3d 1124, 1134 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rovner, J., concurring); Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v.
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Many lawyers also take a dim view of dicta on unbriefed issues: “When
the court expresses dicta on an issue that is unbriefed and not supported
by a factual record, it necessarily expresses an opinion that is not fully
informed. Nevertheless, the dicta will influence the law in the district
courts or state courts without being fully considered by . . . the court.”104
Obiter dicta have been widely criticized as unreliable105 and violative
of proper procedures, because dicta are not based on full briefing and
have not received the court’s full consideration.106 Thus, it has always
been the rule that when court opinions go beyond what is necessary to
decide a case, the court’s views “may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is
presented for decision.”107 When dicta are written, the court is less
likely to fully consider the possible effect of the rule on all other
cases.108 Accordingly, dicta are generally viewed as not providing a
binding precedent,109 and will be more freely reversed.110 Nevertheless,
Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 1986) (Flaum, J., concurring in the
judgment) (criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s majority opinion for commenting on an issue
that was neither briefed nor argued); Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 175–76 (3d
Cir. 1984) (Sloviter, J., concurring); Stefanac v. Cranbrook Educ. Cmty., 458 N.W.2d
56, 83 (Mich. 1990) (Levin, J., dissenting).
104. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 686.
105. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1536 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(Edmondson, J., concurring in the result) (“[D]icta is inherently unreliable for what a
court will do once faced with a question squarely and once its best thoughts, along with
briefs and oral argument, are focused on the precise issue.”); Michael Sean Quinn,
Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication: An Irreducible
Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 713 (1999).
106. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997
(1994).
107. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
108. Id. at 399–400; accord Santamorena v. Georgia Military Coll., 147 F.3d 1337,
1342–43 n.13. (11th Cir. 1998); see United States v. Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1109–10
(3d Cir. 1996) (commenting that a statement in a prior opinion concerning an issue not
briefed or argued on appeal is dicta and is not binding precedent); Bruns v. Ledbetter,
583 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that “vagrant [appellate] observations
about important questions” that sua sponte “went beyond the scope of the questions
presented” are “wholly nugatory”); Roberts v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm’n, 869
S.W.2d 139, 142–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that sua sponte comments in an earlier
opinion were obiter dictum and were not controlling).
109. See, e.g., Watt v. Ann Arbor Bd. of Educ., 600 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999). But see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388–89 & n.5
(1988) (stating that a decision was not dicta just because the issue was not briefed and
that even if it were dicta, the court is still bound by the view of the Federal Circuit).
110. See, e.g., Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582, 583–84 (Alaska 1963)
(reversing an earlier sua sponte retroactivity ruling because dicta were not properly
considered); Flax v. Kansas Tpk. Auth., 596 P.2d 446, 449 (Kan. 1979) (stating that
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courts often wish to guide future conduct, and write dicta despite the
rule.111
In writing dicta instead of a holding, the court at least pretends to
abide by the waiver rule, which precludes the court from deciding the
issue.112 Nevertheless, the court views the issue as too interesting to
deprive the world of its views, even if its views do not have the benefit
of briefs and have no controlling legal effect.113
C. Doing Justice by Clarifying What the Parties Presented
Finally, there are situations where an issue is not fully briefed but is
necessary to the decision. This can occur when the court feels that the
litigants have not raised the proper legal issues or identified the correct
principle of law.114
1. Courts Frequently Will Cite to Precedent that the Parties
Have Not Raised
The Supreme Court has ruled that appellate courts are free to decide
pure questions of law by citing to precedent not cited to the trial court.115
As Judge Posner elaborated:
Judges are not umpires, calling balls and strikes; or judges of a moot court,

dicta are not binding upon the court after it has opportunity for further enlightenment by
briefs and arguments).
111. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46–48 (1994) (arguing that
dicta may have greater weight if it was fully considered by the court, even if it turned out
not to be necessary to the decision).
112. See United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1280–81 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J.) (commenting sua sponte on an antitrust issue; noting that the
government had not raised the issue and therefore had waived it).
113. The Rockford Memorial case is a good example of this as well. Id.
114. Williams-Guice v. Bd. of Educ., 45 F.3d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.)
(“[L]itigants’ failure to address the legal question from the right perspective does not
render us powerless to work the problem out properly. A court of appeals may and often
should do so unbidden rather than apply an incorrect rule of law to the parties’
circumstances.”). After citing this language, Eric Miller added:
Judge Easterbrook’s observation reflects the fact that courts are properly
concerned with more than just the interests of litigants. The adjudication of
cases generates precedents and clarifies the law, providing benefits to everyone
in society. The precedent-generating function of courts is inhibited when
courts defer to parties’ incorrect statements of the law rather than declare
which legal principles in fact govern the case. Moreover, courts have a valid
interest in preserving their own institutional prestige and legitimacy, both of
which are reduced when courts decide cases based on incorrect principles of
law.
Miller, supra note 22, at 1048 (footnotes omitted).
115. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511–14 (1994).
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awarding victory to the side that argues better . . . . Appellate courts do rely on
counsel to present the grounds for reversal, but in this country, unlike the
practice in England, where the judges have no law clerks, they do not depend on
counsel to find all the cases and all the reasons in support of the appeal. The
better lawyers resent this, feeling that it is “unfair” for judges to do the work of
the weaker lawyers. But that is the way it is . . . .116

2. Reframing Issues Pending Before the Court
The Supreme Court has not limited appellate courts to citing new
precedent—it has ruled that appellate courts can reframe the legal
theories posed by the parties, in order to ensure that the law is correctly
decided. As the Court wrote in United States National Bank of Oregon
v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.: “[w]hen an issue or
claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the
particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of
governing law . . . .”117 The court noted that prohibiting the appellate
court from reframing the issues would allow the parties to force the court
to misstate the law by agreeing on the legal issue presented.118 This
could lead to the opinion of a court on hypothetical acts of Congress or
dubious constitutional principles. Accordingly, the Court said it was
proper for a court to decide that a law had been repealed—even though
that issue had not been raised: “[A] court may consider an issue
‘antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of ‘the dispute before it,

116. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); accord
Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (“A court
should apply the right body of law even if the parties fail to cite their best cases.”). It is
difficult to reconcile Judge Posner’s opinion in Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. and
his observation in Smith. Compare Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay
Hosp., Inc., 81 F.3d 53, 56 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that it “would not be quite cricket” to
rest a ground of decision on a ground not raised until oral argument on appeal), with
Smith, 59 F.3d at 665 (stating the view that “[j]udges are not umpires”). Perhaps it has
something to do with the difference between cricket and baseball. For more discussion
of the metaphor of judges as umpires, see Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he
Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and “The Sex Stuff,” 28 CONN. L.
REV. 813, 832–35 (1996).
117. United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 446–47 (1993) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991)
(alteration in original)). In Kamen, the Court said that reframing the issues is permitted,
but not required; an appellate court has discretion to treat an issue as waived and deprive
the party of unfavorable precedent when the party does not raise the issue or precedent in
a timely fashion. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 100 n.5.
118. United States Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 447.
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even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief.”119 Furthermore, the
Court stated that a court “need not render judgment on the basis of a rule
of law whose nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply
because the parties agree upon it.”120
Raising cases not cited by the parties is an easily understood exception
to the adversary process model. Reframing the legal theories to ensure
the law is correctly decided takes the court’s inclination to do justice a
little further. It can often be difficult to see the line between new
theories and new points.121 Nevertheless, a rule that appellate courts will
reframe issues but not raise new ones is a distinction that is still tethered
to seeing that the law is correctly stated and applied. But the Supreme
Court has not stopped there.
D. Going All the Way: The Gorilla Rule
In Singleton122 the Supreme Court discussed when questions may be
raised on appeal for the first time (not necessarily sua sponte). After
stating the general rule that such issues will not be considered, the Court
then said there was no general rule, and announced what Professor
Martineau referred to as the “gorilla rule” (based on the old joke about
where a 500 pound gorilla can sit):123
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on
appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be
exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule.
Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified
in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution is
beyond any doubt or where “injustice might otherwise result.”124

After Singleton, the general rule is that issues will not be taken up for the
first time on appeal, except there is no general rule. Instead, the Court
promulgated the gorilla rule—that an issue can be raised for the first
time on appeal if it is a really easy issue or if “injustice might otherwise
result.”125
119. Id. (quoting Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)).
120. Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)). See generally Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 622 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e are not
bound to decide a matter of constitutional law based on a concession by the particular
party before the Court as to the proper legal characterization of the facts.”); see also
Miller, supra note 22, at 1045–47.
121. See Campbell, supra note 29, at 97–98.
122. See supra notes 43, 54–55 (discussion of the Singleton case).
123. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1023.
124. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (citation omitted) (quoting
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
125. Id.
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Following the gorilla rule, the Court has said that even if an argument
is not pressed before it, the Court will feel free to review an issue if the
issue was passed on below.126 Going a step further are Supreme Court
cases that state that once a federal claim is properly presented, a party
can make any argument in support of that claim, and is not limited to the
precise arguments made below.127
E. The Gorilla Rule at Work: Areas Where Courts Have
Acted Sua Sponte
Despite the difficulty, some lower courts have tried to articulate neutral
principles explaining when matters should be considered sua sponte.128
But reviewing the types of cases in which the Supreme Court and lower
courts have acted sua sponte makes it difficult to articulate consistent
general principles for sua sponte action—other than the gorilla rule.129
126. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995) (citing United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992)); see also Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 29
(1984) (relying on the briefs below even though the issue was not briefed in the Supreme
Court); STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 344. Indeed, in Williams, the Court said that a
point just had to have been mentioned by the court below as a settled rule of law. The
Court found it important that the United States had argued the point in a prior case
below, even though it had not been argued in Williams. Williams, 504 U.S. at 43–45.
127. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J.) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519, 534 (1992)).
128. A typical formulation is in Hardiman v. Reynolds:
Generally, where the parties have not raised a defense, the court should
not address the defense sua sponte. . . .
However, this general rule contains at least two important exceptions.
First, a court must raise a defense sua sponte if that defense implicates the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Second, as noted by the Third Circuit,
where a “doctrine implicates [nonjurisdictional] values that may transcend the
concerns of the parties to an action, it is not inappropriate for the court, on its
own motion, to invoke the doctrine.”
Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502–03 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)
(quoting Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 1987)). Although Hardiman was
a habeas case, the principles here were not limited to habeas actions; see also, e.g., City
of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1101 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that the issues not argued below are waived “except in rare cases
involving jurisdiction or if justice demands flexibility” (quoting Magicsilk Corp. v.
Vinson, 924 F.2d 123, 125 (7th Cir. 1991))).
129. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1056–59. One way of dealing with a sua
sponte issue is to deny that it is being raised sua sponte. As quoted above, the Supreme
Court in United States National Bank of Oregon said that an appellate court is free to
reframe issues in order to apply the proper construction of governing law and avoid
deciding a hypothetical or dubious issue. See discussion supra notes 117–20. But on
many occasions when courts act sua sponte, they do not try to characterize their action as
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Examples of sua sponte action include the following types of cases.130
1. Jurisdiction
The most accepted ground for acting sua sponte is jurisdictional.131
This is part of the rule that a court is always free to raise subject matter
jurisdiction.132 As corollaries to the jurisdiction rule, courts often raise
sua sponte prudential issues that are related to the courts’ power to act
and related issues such as standing, capacity, and ripeness.133
2. Limiting Federal Court Power
Because of the increased concerns about the role of the federal courts
just a different ground for review; they recognize that they are raising a new issue but
point to some prior court decision that considered a similar new issue. See Martineau,
supra note 29, at 1034–35 & n.36 (collecting cases).
130. Allan Vestal pointed out that we will usually know that a court has decided an
issue sua sponte only if there is a separate opinion raising the point. Vestal, supra note
29, at 497.
131. See, e.g., id. at 498–502; see also STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346;
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1045–46 (collecting cases); Campbell, supra note 29, at
100–04; Lawner, supra note 59, at 1282–86; Miller, supra note 22, at 1040–41
(collecting cases); Schopler, supra note 29, at 950–65. A court’s having subject matter
jurisdiction can be seen as a precondition to Professor Martineau’s general rule. See
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1047.
132. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Freytag v.
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 896 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (stating that a subject matter jurisdiction defect must be noticed by the court
sua sponte at any point in litigation). While a court will raise the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte, many federal courts will not raise sua sponte a point that
will create jurisdiction. See Perry R. Pennington Co. v. T.R. Miller Co., 994 F.2d 390,
392–93 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing to take action to correct judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(c), which would restore appellate jurisdiction, because the court
had thought of it and counsel had not asked); cf. Guar. Nat’l Title Co. v. J.E.G. Assocs.,
101 F.3d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (refusing to give lawyers another
chance to allege facts showing diversity jurisdiction).
133. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (stating
that courts may raise ripeness issues sua sponte, whether as a matter of jurisdiction or as
a prudential matter); Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 488 n.4 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the court is obligated to raise standing sua sponte
(citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977))); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident
& Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the capacity to sue
may be raised sua sponte when there is a question as to collusion in order to create
federal jurisdiction, and remanding the issue for resolution of factual questions in the
trial court); cf. Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995). In Frietsch, Chief
Judge Posner applied waiver to foreclose an argument arising from venue and forum
selection clause rules. Id. at 830. A dissent suggested an exception was appropriate
because the court’s result would leave the plaintiff with no remedy (due to German law)
but would only allow the late raising of the argument where it would prejudice no one
and where venue was similar to jurisdiction. Id. at 831 (Shabaz, J., dissenting). The loss
of a valid claim did not move the majority. Id. at 830.
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in injunction cases, particularly cases involving state governments,
federal courts raise comity or abstention134 or sovereign immunity135
questions sua sponte, even if they have been waived.136 Similarly,
federal courts have raised questions about the propriety or scope of an
injunction or consent decree sua sponte.137
3. Questions of Law
Courts have said that they are more likely to raise pure questions of
law, involving no fact-finding, sua sponte.138 There are also particular
134. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396 n.2 (1975) (ruling on an Eleventh
Amendment question); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1390–92 (10th Cir. 1996);
Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855–56 (9th Cir. 1992);
Miller, supra note 22, at 1044–45 (discussing courts’ willingness to consider issues sua
sponte when they involve “nonjurisdictional doctrines of judicial restraint”); see also
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134–35 (deciding a habeas case); Eaglin v. Welborn,
57 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Posner, C.J.) (collecting cases) (stating that
the Supreme Court has a more relaxed attitude on waiver in questions involving comity);
ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 796–97 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (raising sua sponte
the question of relations between governments and finding waiver inapplicable);
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1050.
135. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1047–49. For an argument that sovereign
immunity questions should be treated as jurisdictional matters that should always be
raised sua sponte see Lawner, supra note 59, at 1282–86. The comment states strong
policy reasons why raising sovereign immunity sua sponte would address the problem of
states being allowed to litigate a matter in the trial court, see how it goes, then raise
sovereign immunity on appeal. Id.; see Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S.
381, 393–98 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. See Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54,
468 U.S. 491, 500 n.9 (1984) (enforcing the waiver of a Younger abstention claim
against a state attorney general); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515–16
n.19 (1982) (declining to raise sua sponte an Eleventh Amendment issue that was waived
and specifically not asserted at oral argument); id. at 524–25 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for applying the waiver doctrine); Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124
(7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (applying waiver to a prison warden and a state official
because they failed to raise the issue, despite an intervening favorable opinion); id. at
1128–30 (Ripple, J., concurring) (criticizing the court for applying the waiver doctrine
aggressively in a case involving state sovereignty); Winston v. Children and Youth
Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991) (following Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 468 U.S. 491).
137. McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 n.* (7th Cir. 1997)
(Easterbrook, J.) (stating in dicta that the appeals court must act to vacate an injunction
exceeding the district court’s power under Article III of the Constitution, regardless of
waiver); ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 797–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.).
138. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1035–40 (collecting cases). If a pure issue of
law has been waived below but briefed in the appellate court, it will sometimes be
considered. Diersen v. Chicago Car Exch., 110 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1997) (“There is
no reason to defer its resolution to another case. There will be no better time to resolve
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situations where courts are more likely to raise an issue sua sponte.
These include the following: if the issue was posed by a new court
decision since the lower court ruling139 to reconsider an existing
precedent about which the court is concerned,140 if the questions are
antecedent to the issues presented and dispositive of the dispute,141 or if
the issue involves the retroactivity of the court’s decision.142
4. Frivolous Cases
Courts are more likely to raise an issue sua sponte in a frivolous case.143
5. Important Cases
Courts are also more likely to raise an issue sua sponte if they believe
the issue involves a matter of important public concern.144
the issue than now.” (quoting Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 750 (7th
Cir. 1993))); see also Niedert v. Rieger, 200 F.3d 522, 527–28 (7th Cir. 1999).
139. Cf. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 62 F.3d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that waiver is flexible when a party asks remand to permit administrative agency
to consider the intervening precedent). But see Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir.
1999) (Posner, C.J.) (applying waiver to a prison warden and a state official because they
failed to raise the issue, despite an intervening favorable opinion); id. at 1128–30
(Ripple, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court for failing to apply the waiver doctrine).
140. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645–46 (1961); United States v. Spears,
965 F.2d 262, 282 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of a
hearing en banc concerning the court’s sua sponte decision to revise the standard of
appellate review of probable cause cases); United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 250–53
(5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing
the court’s sua sponte decision to revise the standard for the insanity defense, despite the
parties’ failure to argue the issue); see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing for reexamining
sua sponte the validity of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
141. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36–38 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)).
142. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (deciding a habeas case (citing
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 261–62 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (deciding a
habeas case))); cf. Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582, 583 (Alaska 1963)
(stating that the retroactivity discussion in the initial opinion was obiter dictum because
the issue was not briefed, and then reaching an opposite result after briefing).
143. In Lucien v. Johnson, the court reached the merits sua sponte even though they
had not been briefed. There, the state defended a suit involving a claim by a state
prisoner of lost property on the grounds of mootness. The court ruled the case was not
moot but viewed the merits as so frivolous that there was no point in further
consideration, “for we are sure that [the plaintiff] has no claim.” Lucien v. Johnson, 61
F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.).
144. See William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 736–
39 (2000) (stating that the federal circuit has acted inconsistently in considering issues
sua sponte, apparently based on its perception of the importance of the issue); Schopler,
supra note 29, at 965–66 (collecting cases). This factor may also have motivated the
Fourth Circuit to raise the reconsideration of Miranda in United States v. Dickerson. 166
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6. To Avoid Plain Error
Despite its inconsistency with the waiver rule,145 some courts do apply
plain error to civil cases and use the doctrine to avoid applying a strict
theory of waiver.146 Indeed, despite the waiver rule, the Supreme Court
reserves for itself the right to review plain error. Supreme Court Rule
24(1)(a) provides that at its option, “the Court may consider a plain error
not among the questions presented but evident from the record and
otherwise within its jurisdiction to decide.”147 Even courts that normally
claim they will not apply the plain error doctrine, or courts that apply it
strictly, will recognize exceptions to the rule.148
F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see generally, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, Point/Counterpoint: The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the
Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (2000).
145. See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 999–1001 (questioning whether the plain
error standard as applied is meaningful); Navarro, supra note 29, at 1196–1208
(discussing the split in circuits); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 51, § 2558, at 456–69.
146. See, e.g., Holmes v. Texas A&M Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 685–86 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citing Highlands Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 27 F.3d 1027, 1031–32 (5th Cir.
1994)); Chute v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 143 F.3d 629, 631 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1998);
Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., 131 F.3d 1120, 1123–24 (5th Cir. 1997); see also In re
Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 631 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing civil plain error, but
possibly envisioning a standard harsher than in criminal cases); Jeffrey R. Teeters, Case
Note, Internal Consistency of Ohio Jury Interrogatories, O’Connell v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Railroad, 569 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1991), 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 373–74 (1992)
(noting that Ohio courts apply plain error in criminal cases).
147. SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(a). The placement of this sentence in a section on briefs
suggests that it may not extend to issues not briefed. The Court may not, however, feel
such a limitation. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 & n.9 (1976); see
also STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346; Schopler, supra note 29, at 970–75. Of course,
there is no evident principle as to when the Supreme Court will find a plain error and
when it will not. See STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346 (“To an outsider the errors in
those cases seem no more ‘plain’ than other errors not corrected by the Court; indeed in
each of the above cases several Justices dissented.”).
148. See Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (utilizing civil plain
error only to avoid a miscarriage of justice or for error that seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings); Poindexter v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing
civil plain error for miscarriage of justice or instructions that are “patently plainly
erroneous and prejudicial” (citing Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co.,
738 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 585 (1985))); Pa. Envtl. Def.
Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
civil plain error may be sparingly applied for a “serious and flagrant error that
jeopardized the integrity of the proceeding,” such as a “clear deviation from an
established legal rule”); Walden v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 520–21 (3d Cir. 1997);
McKinney v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 113 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that plain
error is only available for questions of subject matter jurisdiction); Stringel v. Methodist
Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 89 F.3d 415, 421–23 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that plain error is

1283

FINALMILLER.DOC

2/3/2020 3:02 PM

7. When the Issue Has Already Been Mentioned
Courts are more likely to raise an issue without full briefing if it has
been raised by amici, particularly if there has been some briefing or
argument on the subject.149
8. When There Is Little Additional Work Involved
Courts are more likely to decide a new issue without briefing if there
is little additional work involved.150
9. To Affirm the Judgment Below
Courts are more likely to raise an issue sua sponte to affirm the
judgment below, than to reverse it.151
10. Because the Case Is Before Trial
Courts have decided a new issue sua sponte because the case is before
trial and raises a potential claim that should be fully considered.152
reserved for “the truly extraordinary case”); Prymer v. Ogden, 29 F.3d 1208, 1214 (7th
Cir. 1994) (stating that plain error may only be treated as open if exceptional
circumstances exist, substantial rights are affected, and in order to avoid a miscarriage of
justice (quoting Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1362 (7th Cir. 1988))); see also Amcel
Corp. v. Int’l Executive Sales, Inc., 170 F.3d 32, 34–37 (1st Cir. 1999) (distinguishing
among raised issues, deliberately waived issues, and issues not waived in connection
with the appellate court’s decision to address an issue not preserved, and finding that
plain error exists in civil cases under Federal Rule of Evidence 103).
149. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457–58 n.* (1994) (deciding a
criminal case and stating that the Court will consider arguments raised in amicus brief,
but chose not to do so because it involved a statute and the United States had declined to
take a position); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 108–110 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3
(1961). But see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 523 n.10 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases) (criticizing the Court for deciding the case on a ground
advanced by amicus curiae and not by the party); Batson, 476 U.S. at 117 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960) (stating that if a
point made in an amicus brief has never been advanced by petitioners, the Court has no
reason to pass upon it)). See generally STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 344–45 (stating
that the Court’s position on deciding issues raised only in amicus brief is “fluid and
unpredictable”).
150. Vestal, supra note 29, at 510.
151. The Supreme Court is more likely to raise an issue that was not presented for
review by the petitioner if it has been asserted by the respondent as an alternate ground
for affirmance. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 109 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see id. at
116–17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally Vestal, supra note 29, at 506–07.
152. See Lang v. Bank of N.D., 423 N.W.2d 501, 502–03 (N.D. 1988); see also
United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting)
(deciding a criminal case), vacated by 531 U.S. 1135 (2001).
There is . . . no rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which
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11. To Protect Pro Se Litigants
A few courts have raised an issue sua sponte to protect a pro se
litigant.153 However, this seems out of fashion at the moment.
12. To Determine Facts
A recent article argues that the Supreme Court often determines facts
on its own.154
13. In the Interests of Justice
Courts have decided cases sua sponte to avoid a “miscarriage of
justice” or to prevent a result “inconsistent with substantial justice.”155
Unfortunately, these phrases are almost meaningless, because any time
the new issue would affect the result, it could be a miscarriage of justice
for the party that lost below not to be permitted to raise the issue.156

courts of review invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all
questions which have not previously been specifically urged. Indeed there
could not be without doing violence to the statutes which give federal appellate
courts the power to modify, reverse or remand decisions as may be just under
the circumstances. Exceptional cases or particular circumstances may prompt
a reviewing court, where injustice might otherwise result or where public
policy requires, to consider questions neither pressed nor passed upon below.
Id. (quoting Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1961) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
153. See Gramegna v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 675, 677–78 (11th Cir. 1988) (suspending
the rules and raising a matter sua sponte to protect a pro se litigant).
154. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly
Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 333–51 (1999) (stating
that the Supreme Court’s fact-finding has gone beyond judicial notice in a variety of
contexts).
155. Estate of Vak v. Comm’r, 973 F.2d 1409, 1412 (8th Cir. 1992); see Waldman,
supra note 85, at 64 (collecting cases) (applying standards like “whenever public interest
or justice so warrants”).
156. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1041–42; see also Campbell, supra note 29,
at 175–76.
[C]ommon sense supports the proposition that this court will not decline to
consider a proposition of law that goes directly to the merits of the entire case,
though the question was never presented to or determined by the trial court.
Otherwise a result absolutely unwarranted by law might have to stand, and
great injustice follow.
Id. (quoting Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Sprague, 167 N.W. 124, 125
(Minn. 1918)).
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14. Because the Issue Is Related to Another Issue Before the Court
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association,157 the Court decided a
question that had not been briefed, had not been addressed below, and
that the parties agreed was not before it.158 Over a vigorous dissent by
Justice Stevens,159 the Court justified its procedure by saying that the
issue decided was “intimately bound up” with the Court’s discussion and
was “easily subsumed within the question on which we granted
certiorari.”160 The Court added: “The Court has not always confined
itself to the set of issues addressed by the parties.”161
15. For No Reason at All
In United States v. Feola,162 the Court decided a question163 that was
not presented in the certiorari petition, was not briefed or argued, and
was squarely presented in the certiorari petition in another case pending
at the same time.164 Justice Stewart, dissenting, asked why Feola could
not have been held until after certiorari was granted in the second case
and after it was argued and decided.165 The Court’s only response was
that “we are not always guided by concessions of the parties, and the
very considerations of symmetry urged by the Government suggest that
we first turn our attention” to this issue.166
* * * * *
All of these cases exist side-by-side with the waiver cases. They are
hopelessly irreconcilable with them.
157. 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (considering the circumstances where punitive damages
could be awarded under Title VII, and deciding not to apply common law agency
principles to punitive damages).
158. Id. at 552–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Respondent’s counsel had stated at oral
argument that: “[W]e all agree . . . that that precise issue is not before the Court.” Id. at
552.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 540.
161. Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 and n.1
(1998)); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243–249 (1989); Cont’l
Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 667–75 (1935).
162. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
163. The question was whether an assault on a federal officer violates 18 U.S.C. §
111 even when the assailant is unaware that the victim is a federal officer. Feola, 420
U.S. at 696–97 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
164. See id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Fernandez v. United States, 420 U.S.
990 (1975)).
165. Id. at 697 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“This conspicuous disregard of the most
basic principle of our adversary system of justice seems to me indefensible.”).
166. Id. at 677.
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F. Courts Exercise Almost Unbridled Discretion in Deciding Which
Issues to Raise Sua Sponte
In summary, apart from questions of jurisdiction, courts are more
likely to raise an issue sua sponte if they think a case is really important
or if the judges really want to reach a particular result.167 This, of
course, poses dangers, depending on the political views and restraint of the
judges.168 Why did the Seventh Circuit apply the waiver doctrine harshly
to orphans in Hartmann and to victims of discrimination in Sanders and
DeClue, but not to the states opposing partial birth abortions in Hope
Clinic or to the corporate demand requirement in derivative actions in

167. See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1004–05 (stating that there is no discernable
set of guidelines between or even within circuits as to when a new issue raised by parties
should be heard); see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 257 n.15
(1981) (implying that the Court can disregard procedural norms and consider issues that
would normally be considered waived whenever it feels it appropriate); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (suggesting that the plain error provision of then
Supreme Court Rule 40(1)(d)(2) permitted the Court to raise sua sponte a plain error not
presented). See also Justice Powell’s rather odd comment in Robbins v. California: “The
parties have not pressed this argument in this case and it is late in the Term for us to
undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines.” Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 435 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Is sua sponte reconsideration
acceptable earlier in the Term?
168. Compare Judge Easterbrook’s sua sponte raising of a new issue in Hope Clinic
v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 869 (7th Cir. 1999), with the opinion of the court in Sanders v.
Village of Dixmoor, 178 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1999), where he provided the decisive vote.
See supra text accompanying notes 70–72. Also compare Chief Judge Posner’s criticism
of the Hope Clinic majority with his dissent in Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894,
905 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). The Kopec majority charged Chief Judge
Posner with raising a number of issues not raised by the parties. Id. at 902 n.5; see also,
e.g., Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that a claim of
retaliation in employment was waived because the employee only raised a harassment
claim).
It is also difficult to reconcile the views of Judges Posner and Easterbrook on waiver
and raising issues sua sponte with their tendency to deny parties leave to amend the
complaint or raise new issues after discovery. Compare Eckstein v. Balcor Film
Investors, 58 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Years into a complex piece of
commercial litigation, a district judge is entitled to treat the issues as frozen.”), with
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1347 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,
J.) (creating sua sponte federal common law of demand on corporate directors), rev’d,
500 U.S. 90 (1991); compare Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 903 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner,
C.J.) (stating that a claim for false arrest was not raised until after judgment was waived,
even though facts were pleaded in the complaint), with Goodhand v. United States, 40
F.3d 209, 214 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (stating that the fact that the plaintiff’s
lawyer in the heat of argument did not mention any other alleged act of negligence
should not be held against him).
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Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.?169 Why did the Supreme
Court raise and decide issues sua sponte in Mapp, Washington v. Davis, or
Erie Railroad, but refuse to address them in so many other cases? It is
hard to reach any conclusion but that sua sponte decision of new issues
has been subject to the gorilla rule of unbridled discretion.170
If we are left with courts acting based on their sense of injustice in
each case, exercising unbridled discretion, what happens to the idea of a
rule of law that includes procedural norms? As Judge Easterbrook said:
Legal rules committing decisions to judicial discretion suppose that the court
will have, and give, sound reasons for proceeding one way rather than the other.
“We must not invite the exercise of judicial impressionism. Discretion there
may be, but ‘methodized by analogy, disciplined by system.’ Discretion without a
criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness.”171

In fact, if courts can decide issues that parties have not raised or
addressed, are the parties receiving due process of law?
V. DO SUA SPONTE DECISIONS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS?
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether an appellate
court must give parties the opportunity to brief a new issue before
169. 908 F.2d 1338, 1347 (7th Cir. 1990) (ruling sua sponte and creating a federal
common law of demand on corporate directors); see also supra notes 15–16, 69–81.
170. See Martineau, supra note 29, passim; STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 346
(“The exception from the normal rule is not circumscribed by any particular formula, and
that it reflects the Court’s discretionary authority to dispose of cases in what it
determines to be the most sensible and reasonable way.”).
[T]he theory [of the plain error exception] has never developed into a
principled test, but has remained essentially a vehicle for reversal when the
predilections of a majority of an appellate court are offended. . . . The theory
has been formulated in terms of what a particular majority of an appellate court
considers basic or fundamental. Such a test is unworkable when neither the test
itself nor the case law applying it develop a predictable, neutrally-applied
standard.
Martineau, supra note 29, at 1033 (quoting Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322
A.2d 114, 116–17 (Pa. 1974).
171. York Ctr. Park Dist. v. Krilich, 40 F.3d 205, 209 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.) (deciding a habeas case) and
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 139, 141 (1921)); see also Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 566–73 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting on a
habeas decision and stating that because the abuse of discretion review is very
deferential, a court of appeals’ decision to recall mandate sua sponte should be deferred
to something approaching a clear error standard); People v. Kuntu, 720 N.E.2d 1047,
1050–52 (Ill. 1999) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring) (using a rule that either errors
affecting substantial rights will not be waived or the plain error doctrine involves stating
conclusions and stating that a court must explain why a particular case justifies departure
from procedural norms); Martineau, supra note 29, at 1033–34 (stating that plain error or
interests of justice review of new issues on appeal is inconsistent with appellate process
because each ignores precedent, turns only on the factors of one case, and makes
predictability impossible).
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deciding it.
Do sua sponte decisions—without opportunity for
briefing—violate due process? If not, are they, at a minimum, an abuse
of judicial power?
A. Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard
1. The Basic Principles
The Supreme Court wrote: “The core of due process is the right to
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”172 In most contexts,
the Court has said that a meaningful opportunity to be heard requires that
the hearing occur before the decision is made. The basic cases in this
line are Goldberg v. Kelly173 and Mathews v. Eldridge.174 Under
Goldberg and Mathews, where a statute creates a right to receive
benefits, due process requires a pretermination hearing before the
benefits can be stopped by the government.175
In subsequent cases, courts have looked to see whether a hearing prior
to the initial decision is required for the decisionmaking process to
comply with due process, or whether a hearing following the initial
decision provides all the process that is due. In United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property,176 the Court ruled that when property is
taken by forfeiture, a hearing must precede the government seizure.177
The Court said exceptions to the general rule of predeprivation notice
and hearing could occur only in “extraordinary situations where some
valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the event.”178 Determining whether a particular
judicial remedy justifies an exception to the general rule of
172. Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998); see also Gosnell v. City of
Troy, 59 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating that notice and an
opportunity to be heard is “due process in its proper sense”).
173. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
174. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
175. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59–61 (1999)
(discussing the requirement of a statutorily created property interest in continued benefits
before the right to a pretermination hearing accrues and construing Goldberg v. Kelly and
Mathews v. Eldridge).
176. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
177. Id. at 62; see also United States v. 20832 Big Rock Drive, 51 F.3d 1402, 1405
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that absent exigent circumstances, the government must provide
preseizure notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard).
178. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))).
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predeprivation notice and hearing “requires an examination of the
competing interests at stake, along with the promptness and adequacy of
later proceedings.”179
To make that examination, the Court looked to the three-part inquiry
of Mathews v. Eldridge. Under Mathews, a court must weigh the
following three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the
administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would
impose.180 The governmental interest in efficiency is not a general
interest but the interest in prompt action before a full hearing was
possible.181 In weighing these factors, the James Daniel Good Real
Property Court put the judicial thumb firmly on the side of predeprivation
court hearings before a seizure: “[F]airness can rarely be obtained by
secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . . No better
instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to
meet it.”182
The analyses in Mathews and James Daniel Good Real Property
suggest that the due process issue is substantial. Sua sponte decisions
deny the parties a significant private interest—whatever the subject of
the litigation. They increase the possibility for error by a court because
the court does not have the benefit of the parties’ views. And providing
notice and an opportunity to be heard may not substantially impair a
court’s interest in efficiency.
2. Supreme Court Cases on Sua Sponte Action
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on whether sua sponte
decisions violate due process, it has issued a number of rulings on
related points (in addition to the decisions stating general due process
principles).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 56.
182. Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
170–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (alteration in original)). The Court continued:
The purpose of an adversary hearing is to ensure the requisite neutrality that
must inform all governmental decision-making. . . . [T]he availability of a
postseizure hearing may be no recompense for losses caused by erroneous
seizure. Given the congested civil dockets in federal courts, a claimant may
not receive an adversary hearing until many months after the seizure.
Id. at 55–56.
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a. Sua Sponte Trial Court Dismissals May Violate Due Process
The Court has addressed several issues concerning sua sponte
dismissals by trial courts. For example, the Court ruled that “before an
absent class member’s right of action was extinguishable due process
required that the member ‘receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard
and participate in the litigation.’”183 In another case, the Court expressly
reserved ruling on the “permissible scope, if any, of sua sponte
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).”184
The Court did hold that sua sponte dismissals do not invariably violate
the due process clause in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.185 There, the
Court held that a trial court is authorized, if the party to be dismissed had
sufficient warning, to dismiss a case sua sponte as a sanction under Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Link, the Court said
that while due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard,
“this does not mean that every order entered without notice and a
preliminary adversary hearing offends due process.”186 If the party has
sufficient notice to recognize the consequences, advance notice and a
hearing are not necessarily required.187 Furthermore, the Court added
that the availability of Rule 60(b) relief “renders the lack of prior notice
of less consequence.”188
b. Failing to Give a Party a Chance to Respond Violates Due Process
In Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.,189 the Supreme Court ruled that due
process was violated when a court added a defendant and entered
judgment without giving the defendant an opportunity to file a
183. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999) (quoting Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)).
184. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 n.8 (1989). The holding of Neitzke,
concerning the proper scope of sua sponte dismissals in in forma pauperis litigation, was
overturned by statute. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996). See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(collecting cases).
185. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
186. Id. at 632.
187. Id., quoted in Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust
Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994); accord, e.g., Claude E. Atkins Enters., Inc. v.
United States, 899 F.2d 1180, 1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
188. Link, 370 U.S. at 632; accord Brent v. Bd. of Trs. of Davis & Elkins Coll., 311
S.E.2d 153, 158 (W. Va. 1983).
189. 529 U.S. 460, 465–68 (2000).
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responsive pleading. The Court said that the “opportunity to respond” is
“fundamental to due process.”190 The Court added that “[b]eyond
doubt . . . a prospective party cannot fairly be required to answer an
amended pleading not yet permitted, framed, and served.”191 Citing to
Alice in Wonderland, the Court observed that “[p]rocedure of this style
has been questioned even in systems, real and imaginary, less concerned
than ours with the right to due process.”192
c. Appellate Decisions Reached Without Full Briefing Are
Given Lesser Weight
As part of its ambivalence on sua sponte decisions, the Court has ruled
that decisions reached without full briefing and argument have a lesser
precedental value for purposes of stare decisis.193 But even Supreme
Court Justices who have criticized deciding issues sua sponte have not
always questioned the Court’s power to do so. In Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,194 for example, Justice Souter
criticized the Court’s earlier decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.195 In Church of
the Lukumi, Justice Souter said the rule announced in the Smith decision
was squarely addressed by neither party. He added that “[s]ound judicial
decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous
defense’ of the issues in dispute and a constitutional rule announced sua
sponte is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing
and argument.”196 After noting that the Smith rule was unnecessary to
the result, Justice Souter continued:

190. Id. at 466.
191. Id. at 467.
192. Id. at 468 n.2 (citing LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH
THE LOOKING GLASS 108 (Messner 1982) (1978)).
193. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (collateral review).
194. 508 U.S. 520, 571–73 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (criticizing Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). Smith was also criticized for its sua sponte decision in an
article by Michael McConnell. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1113–14 (1990) (“The most important
decision interpreting the Free Exercise Clause in recent history . . . was rendered in a
case in which the question was entirely hypothetical, irrelevant to the disposition of the
case as a matter of state law, and neither briefed nor argued by the parties.”).
195. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
196. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 572 (citations omitted). Justice
Souter quoted Ladner v. United States, stating that the Court was “declining to address
‘an important and complex’ issue concerning scope of collateral attack upon criminal
sentences because it had received ‘only meagre argument’ from the parties, and the
Court thought it ‘should have the benefit of a full argument before dealing with the
question.’” Id. (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173 (1958)).
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While I am not suggesting that the Smith Court lacked the power to announce its
rule, I think a rule of law unnecessary to the outcome of a case, especially one not
put into play by the parties, approaches without more the sort of ‘dicta . . . which
may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.’197

d. Stanley v. Illinois: No Due Process in Stating a New
Rule on Due Process
The most ironic sua sponte case is undoubtedly Stanley v. Illinois.198
In Stanley, the Court required hearings, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, before a state could terminate the parental
rights of unwed fathers. In ringing language, the majority said that
considerations of efficiency alone cannot overcome the need for
procedures to protect citizens from the overbearing concern for
efficiency:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.199

Chief Justice Burger’s dissent criticized the ruling, inter alia, because the
Due Process Clause argument had been neither briefed nor argued, but
was raised sua sponte. The dissent also criticized the Court for setting
up straw arguments against its holding that had not been made by the
state. The Chief Justice did not, however, claim that the Court’s action
itself violated due process.200

197. Id. at 572–73 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Souter continued:
I do not, of course, mean to imply that a broad constitutional rule announced
without full briefing and argument necessarily lacks precedential weight. Over
time, such a decision may become ‘part of the tissue of the law,’ . . . and may
be subject to reliance in a way that new and unexpected decisions are not.
Id. at 573 (quoting Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)); accord Lebron v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 404 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning the
Court’s prudence, but not its authority, in addressing a waived claim sua sponte).
198. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
199. Id. at 656.
200. Id. at 659–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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B. Some Lower Court Judges Have Taken a Broad View of the Due
Process Implications of Sua Sponte Decisions
Some lower court opinions have gone further than the Supreme Court
by suggesting that sua sponte court decisions can violate due process.
Chief Justice Robin Davis (then Justice) of the West Virginia Court of
Appeals, for example, recently argued that her court’s sua sponte award
of attorneys’ fees, not requested by the parties, was a “fundamental
violation of state and federal due process guarantees” because it
occurred without notice and an opportunity to be heard.201 Her view is
supported by cases which have suggested that sua sponte agency202 or
trial court decisions of issues violate due process.203 This comes up most
frequently when a trial court sua sponte dismisses a nonfrivolous
complaint.
Several courts have held that sua sponte trial court dismissals
violate due process.204 In California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v.
201. Maikotter v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., 527 S.E.2d 802, 808–10 (W. Va.
1999) (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. See Stoyanov v. INS, 172 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Board
of Immigration Appeals decision of issue without notice to the party violated due
process).
203. See Nolen v. Gober, 222 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that
fundamental issues of fairness are raised when the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
decides an issue sua sponte); Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin & McLeod v. State, 711 So. 2d
1246, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the “trial court denied [the law firm]
due process when it sua sponte ruled unenforceable the contingent fee contract on which
those liens were based, without notice and an opportunity for the parties and counsel to
be heard”); Grissom v. Grissom, 886 S.W.2d 47, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the
trial court’s imposition of sanctions sua sponte without notice and hearing violated due
process); Storer Communications of Jefferson County, Inc. v. Oldham County Bd. of
Educ., 850 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment sua sponte was a denial of due process); Brown v. Triple “D”
Drilling Co., 585 P.2d 987, 990 (Kan. 1978) (stating that an order reinstating the case sua
sponte deprives a defendant of due process).
204. See, e.g., Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1527–28 & 1528 n.45 (11th Cir.
1995) (stating that a magistrate judge’s raising of exhaustion and procedural default in a
habeas case sua sponte was improper). “[T]o be afforded due process, [the petitioner]
must receive notice of the court’s inclination to interpose the default, an opportunity to
demonstrate ‘cause’ for the default and ‘prejudice,’ and, if material issues of fact are
present, an opportunity to present his evidence.” Id. at 1528 n.45; see also Roman v.
Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1990) (raising the dismissal issue sua sponte under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which provides due process when the plaintiff
is given an opportunity to address the issue either orally or in writing); Holzer v. Jochim,
557 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1996) (stating that the trial court deprived the party of due process
by redetermining liability sua sponte without notice that issue would be decided); King
v. Mosher, 137 N.H. 453, 629 A.2d 788, 790 (1993) (stating that the fundamental
requirements of due process require that the party be provided with notice and an
opportunity to be heard before dismissal of the nonfrivolous complaint and applying the
state due process clause, N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15). Compare section 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §105(a), which gives the bankruptcy court the power to act
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Musick,205 for example, the Ninth Circuit cited to the rule that due
process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard with “proceedings
as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional
protection is invoked.”206 The court held that it was error to dismiss a
claim on the merits without notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to
respond, noting: “The right to a hearing on the merits of a claim over
which the court has jurisdiction is of the essence of our judicial system,
and the judge’s feeling that the case is probably frivolous does not
justify by-passing that right.”207 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, which
has often issued its own decisions sua sponte, does not approve of the
same practice by trial courts. It has held that a trial court’s sua sponte
dismissal deprives a plaintiff of notice and an opportunity to respond.208
Other appellate courts have prohibited sua sponte trial court dismissals
of nonfrivolous complaints, without reaching the due process issue.209
The reasoning of these decisions is consistent with a ruling, under a due
process analysis, that a party must have notice of the ultimate issue
before being deprived of its day in court.210
sua sponte. See generally In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993).
205. Cal. Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1974).
206. Id. at 280 (quoting Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246
(1944)).
207. Id. at 281 (quoting Harmon v. Superior Court, 307 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir.
1962)). The court reserved ruling on whether a Rule 60(b) post-ruling motion was
sufficient to make “the denial of prior hearing and other due process rights . . . harmless
error.” Id.
208. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Cadle Co., 74 F.3d 835, 836–37 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the district court was required to give notice and an opportunity to respond
before dismissing the complaint sua sponte):
We have found that sua sponte dismissals without such procedures conflict
with our traditional adversarial system principles by depriving the losing party
of the opportunity to present arguments against dismissal and by tending to
transform the district court into ‘a proponent rather than an independent
entity.’. . . [S]uch dismissals often create avoidable appeals and remands,
draining judicial resources and defeating the very purpose for which sua
sponte actions are employed.
Id. (quoting Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1184 (7th Cir. 1989)).
209. United States v. One 1974 Learjet 24D, 191 F.3d 668, 674 (6th Cir. 1999);
Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that it was an abuse of
discretion to raise procedural default in the habeas case sua sponte without giving the
party notice and opportunity to respond before the decision); Porter v. Fox, 99 F.3d 271,
273 (8th Cir. 1996) (deciding a habeas case); see Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310,
1320–21 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Michael, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Note that
the law in habeas cases has been changed by statute. See, e.g., Benson v. O’Brian, 179
F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
210. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (stating

1295

FINALMILLER.DOC

2/3/2020 3:02 PM

C. Some Courts View a Motion for Rehearing as Providing
Sufficient Process
Other courts believe there is no due process violation as long as there
has been an opportunity for reconsideration.211 In an unpublished
opinion, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a rehearing procedure satisfied the
“bare minimum requirements of procedural due process” in a case
involving the request of a prisoner to videotape his execution.212 Despite
discomfort with the procedure, the court said:
[W]e must acknowledge that the plaintiffs did, eventually, brief the issue of the
constitutionality of the videotaping matter on the merits and that this
opportunity to ask for rehearing, under these particular circumstances in this sui
generis case, appear to have given the state court a reasonable opportunity to
rectify its error in denying notice, and thus satisfied the bare minimum
requirements of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.213

These decisions are supported by decisions that hold that sua sponte
trial court dismissals of nonfrivolous complaints do not violate due
process. There are also some decisions that suggest an intermediate
standard, lower than frivolous—that trial courts can dismiss cases sua
sponte if it is patently obvious that the plaintiff cannot obtain relief.214
that the district court must give an opportunity to be heard before dismissing a
nonfrivolous complaint sua sponte); Street v. Fair, 918 F.2d 269, 272 (1st Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (stating that the district court must give notice and an opportunity to be heard
before dismissing nonfrivolous complaint sua sponte); Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d
1109, 1111–12 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that the sua sponte dismissal of nonfrivolous
complaints is “not in accordance with our traditional adversarial system of justice,” and
is “unfair to the litigants and ultimately waste, rather than save judicial resources”);
Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524 (11th Cir.
1983) (stating that notice and an opportunity to be heard is required before dismissal on
the merits of a nonfrivolous complaint); Lewis v. New York, 547 F.2d 4, 5–6 (2d Cir.
1976); see also Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.)
(stating that a trial or appellate court must give notice before granting summary
judgment sua sponte). Not much notice is required however.
211. See also Harris v. Marsh, 123 F.R.D. 204, 218 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (“[T]o the
extent imposition of the original reprimand and fine violated any due process right of
counsel, by providing for reconsideration and seriously entertaining counsel’s
arguments, due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard have now
been satisfied.”).
212. Lawson v. Dixon, No. 94-6640, 1994 WL 258629, at **4 (4th Cir. June 13,
1994) (unpublished opinion).
213. Id. It is surprising that this opinion, with its unusual fact situation and its
decision of a novel issue, was not published. Cf. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d
898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated by 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
214. See, e.g., Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that
sua sponte dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper when it is
“patently obvious” that the plaintiff could not prevail); Baker v. Director, United States
Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that the trial court can
dismiss a case sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the claimant
cannot possibly win relief).
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VI. WHAT SHOULD COURTS DO?
From a legal realist’s perspective, “what process is due” is a
tautology: as much process is due as the Supreme Court says is due.215
In the author’s view, Chief Justice Davis was correct, however, when
she argued that due process requires appellate courts to offer the parties
a meaningful opportunity to be heard before an issue is decided.216 The
Court’s analyses in Mathews v. Eldridge and United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property are fully applicable to sua sponte appellate
decisions.217
But whether or not sua sponte decisions violate due process, the
principles of fairness upon which it is based suggest that a court should
take the obvious course when it thinks the right issue has not been
presented to it. An appellate court should always ask for the parties’
submissions before ruling.218
A. Courts Raising New Issues Frequently Will Ask the Parties for
Further Input Before Ruling
There are two ways input can be sought: first, asking for supplemental
briefing, and second, remanding for a new ruling by the trial court.
1. Asking the Parties for Supplemental Briefs
Many courts routinely ask the parties for supplemental briefs when
deciding a new issue.219 As Chief Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court wrote: “[I]t is only fair that the appellate court direct the
attention of counsel” to legal theories, cases, or other materials not
covered by the briefs, “if it appears that they may affect the outcome of

215. Cf. Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296, 357 (1996) (noting that except for
notice and hearing, the definition of due process is close to tautological).
216. Maikotter v. Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs., 527 S.E.2d 802, 808–10 (W. Va.
1999) (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217. See supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text.
218. Accord William N. Early et al., USCMA and the Specified Issue: The Current
Practice, 123 MIL. L. REV., Winter 1989, at 9, 22.
219. See id. at 26–27 (discussing the practice in several courts); United States v.
Mussari, 168 F.3d 1141, 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (deciding a
criminal case and stating the circuit’s practice of ordering supplemental briefing when it
raises an issue sua sponte).
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the case, and give them the opportunity to submit additional briefs.”220
In 1997, the Supreme Court indicated a preference for requesting
supplemental briefing when a court raises a new issue sua sponte. In
Trest v. Cain,221 Justice Breyer wrote the following dicta for the Court:
We note that the parties might have considered these questions, and the Court of
Appeals might have determined their relevance or their answers, had that court
not decided the . . . question without giving the parties an opportunity for
argument. We do not say that a court must always ask for further briefing when
it disposes of a case on a basis not previously argued. But often, as here, that
somewhat longer (and often fairer) way ‘round is the shortest way home.222

Thus, the Court itself often directs supplemental briefing on issues it
raises sua sponte, either when issuing the order accepting questions for
oral argument,223 or after argument.224 Lower courts also frequently
follow this practice.225 As Justice Ginsburg wrote about the District of
Columbia Circuit: “The parties’ contentions ordinarily determine the
issues to be addressed. If the panel or the opinion writer spots a
potentially dispositive question not raised by the parties, the judges
generally invite supplemental briefs, thereby affording the litigants a
chance to have their say.”226
Cases involving the decision of new issues after supplemental briefing
220. Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate
Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 219 (1957); see also Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis,
Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533,
558 (1977) (arguing that parties should have the opportunity to brief retroactivity before
the issue is decided).
221. 522 U.S. 87 (1997).
222. Id. at 92 (stating that the district court is not required to raise a procedural
default issue sua sponte in the habeas case if the state fails to raise the issue and
declining to decide whether the Fifth Circuit was permitted to raise the issue sua sponte);
see also John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177,
183 (1982) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint teaches us that patience in the judicial
resolution of conflicts may sometimes produce the most desirable result.”).
223. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 115 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases); STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 245, 340 (collecting
cases); cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 476 n.6 (1949) (asking the parties to brief
an issue that had been raised by petitioner, but as to which the Court had not originally
granted certiorari).
224. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 622–23 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting from order directing reargument); Batson, 476 U.S. at 115
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (collecting cases); STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 341
(collecting cases); Krimbel, supra note 27, at 931–46. The Court’s first use of the power
to request rehearing sua sponte was an 1819 case where one of the Justices had been
absent. The first time the Court stated the power to request rehearing sua sponte when a
justice “doubts the correctness of his opinion” was in Brown v. Aspden, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 25, 26–27 (1852). See Krimbel, supra note 27, at 932–33.
225. See United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. 439, 448
(approving the raising of new issues by the court of appeals and ordering supplemental
briefing).
226. Ginsburg, supra note 92, at 214–15 (footnote omitted).
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cover a range of areas. The most frequent area is probably jurisdiction.227
Other common grounds for supplemental briefing include the following:
to address mootness;228 whether to overrule prior precedent;229 whether to
consider an issue not raised below;230 to address an intervening statute,231
ruling232 or precedent;233 to address a portion of an issue the court believes
was not adequately briefed;234 to redecide a case together with new cases
where certiorari has been granted;235 or prior to an award of sanctions.236
227. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1975); Shegog v.
Bd. of Educ., 194 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.); United States v. Accra
Pac, Inc., 173 F.3d 630, 631–32 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.); Union Oil Co. of Cal.
v. John Brown E & C, 121 F.3d 305, 308, (7th Cir. 1997); Peters v. Welsh Dev. Agency,
920 F.2d 438, 440 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Phillips, 844 F.2d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1988)
(supplemental letter briefs); Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 337
(5th Cir. 1981).
228. See, e.g., Buckley v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 111 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir.
1997).
229. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 194–95 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for sua sponte
ordering parties to address question concerning validity of prior precedent that they had
not raised); Batson, 476 U.S. at 115 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (collecting cases where
supplemental briefing was ordered to reconsider precedent); Busby v. Crown Supply,
Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 834 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990) (ordering supplemental briefs on the issue to
permit the en banc court to consider overruling prior RICO precedent).
230. United States Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 445, 448 (stating that the court of
appeals acted within its discretion in raising the validity of the statute sua sponte and
ordering supplemental briefing); Winston v. Children & Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380,
1385 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that after the supplemental briefing, the court would not
consider the abstention issue that had been raised below but not appealed).
231. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d
on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
232. See, e.g., United States v. D.F., 115 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering
the parties’ supplemental statements submitted after remand from the Supreme Court).
233. See, e.g., Turkhan v. INS, 123 F.3d 487, 488 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (ruling after
directing the parties to file briefs on intervening precedent).
234. See, e.g., Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs. v. Shalala, 165 F.3d
1162, 1164 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (ordering supplemental briefs to explore the
purpose of regulation that was at issue in the case).
235. See United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957); see also Krimbel,
supra note 27, at 934–37.
236. This is required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which requires
notice from the court and a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the court issues
sanctions sua sponte. See, e.g., Rosser v. Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1309 (7th Cir.
1988) (ordering supplemental briefing to see if all attorneys should be sanctioned for
failure to advise the court of jurisdictional issues); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc.,
838 F.2d 600, 606–07 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (stating that sanctions comply with due
process when they are issued after notice and briefing). Rule 38 was amended after
earlier sanction orders were issued without notice. See Chicago Council of Lawyers,
supra note 8, at 699–701.
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The Supreme Court has also ordered supplemental briefing when the
Court questions a legal point made by the court below that has not been
challenged by the parties.237 In addition, the Court recently appointed an
amicus curiae to argue for the position taken by the appellate court, when
neither party defended that position in the Supreme Court.238
2. Spotting an Issue and Remanding to the Lower Court
Another option is for a court to spot an issue that has not been briefed
and, if the issue looks decisive, remand it for resolution in the first
instance by the lower court.239 This is the most procedurally conservative
approach to addressing a new issue and is the only one fully consistent
with the usual rule that issues not raised below will not be considered on
appeal.240 Remand protects the role of the district court, which may
have useful light to shed on the issue.
Courts often spot an issue and then remand when a new precedent or
law has arisen since the lower court’s decision.241 Remand is also
frequently used when new facts have arisen since the trial court’s
decision.242 In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,243 for example, the
Court noted that another case decided the same day244 raised a new issue
not briefed or argued by the parties and unnecessary to the decision of
237. See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 129 (1987).
238. See Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 226 n.1
(2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
239. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925,
935–36 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding the issue for resolution in the trial court, and stating
that the capacity to sue may be raised sua sponte when there is a question as to collusion
to create federal jurisdiction); Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997)
(remanding to the trial court for an inquiry on mootness following a sua sponte order
directing supplemental briefing on mootness).
In Chambers Medical Technologies of South Carolina, Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252,
1260 n.11 (4th Cir. 1995), the court was tempted to proceed to a ruling without briefing
or a remand to “resolv[e] the legal uncertainty surrounding this issue and . . . conserv[e]
the resources of the courts and the parties.” The court decided, however, that because a
party was entitled to defend its position, it would remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings on the issue. Id; see also Lang v. Bank of N.D., 423 N.W.2d 501,
502–03 (N.D. 1988) (reversing dismissal with a direction for the trial court to explore a
statute not considered below).
240. See supra notes 52–69 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972) (new regulations);
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264 (1970) (new precedent); Nicely v. McBrayer,
McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, 163 F.3d 376, 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (new precedent). But
cf. Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.) (refusing to
apply new precedent in a habeas case because the state was aware of the argument and
could have raised it below and, perhaps, because the court thought the state’s conduct at
trial was reprehensible).
242. See generally Benjamin, supra note 154.
243. 470 U.S. 729 (1985).
244. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828–35 (1985).
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the issues presented to the Court. The Lorion Court expressed no
opinion as to its proper resolution and stated that the issue was open to
the court of appeals on remand.245
B. The Arguments Against Ordering Supplemental Briefing
Are Not Convincing
Ordering supplemental briefing and argument is not without its
critics. From one side, some judges and commentators view asking the
parties to address an issue they did not raise as too intrusive into the
adversary process.246 Justice Stevens has repeatedly criticized the
Court for sua sponte raising an issue for further briefing, saying it
interferes with the adversary process.247 Other judges view raising a
new issue as fine, but see supplemental briefing as unnecessary. They
may believe that they know the law and do not need assistance, that they
are in as good or better a position than counsel to address and resolve the
issue, or that counsel in a particular case are not likely to add anything
helpful.248 Judges have also expressed concern that the delays caused by
supplemental briefing may outweigh the benefits.249
There appear to be several reasons for the reluctance of appellate
courts to give notice and an opportunity to be heard to appellate litigants
who have missed what the court views as the decisive issue. First, it is
245. Lorion, 470 U.S. at 735 n.8. A variant of this approach is to address the issue
in dicta, then to remand the case for further proceedings. See Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d
1200, 1206–07 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (suggesting the lost-chance theory of
damages in employment discrimination cases despite the fact that it had not been
briefed). This is not as pure as remanding the case for a decision in the first instance,
without comment.
Courts sometimes avoid waiver or the use of dicta by spotting an issue as relevant but
deciding that it is not dispositive and leaving it for another day. See, e.g., Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (stating that the issue raised
by amici was not necessary to the decision and leaving it for another day). This is a
traditional role for a concurring opinion. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht,
524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting important questions but
suggesting resolution in a later case following full briefing and argument).
246. See Krimbel, supra note 27, passim.
247. See supra text accompanying note 10.
248. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 689.
249. See Ellen A. Peters, Forum on Judicial Ethics, 66 NEB. L. REV. 448, 452
(1987). But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 110 (2000) (stating that the parties’
entitlement to an opportunity to be heard prior to when the Florida Supreme Court had
issued statewide standards was of critical importance to the outcome of the presidential
election). The Supreme Court would not waive the opportunity to be heard below, even
though (or some would say because) the presidential election was at stake. See id.
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more efficient not to order rebriefing. It is more difficult for the judges
to consider a case twice than to consider it once. Some courts have
reasoned that additional briefing takes time away from other matters the
courts can consider.250 The efficiency concern is particularly strong for
appellate courts that sit in rotating panels. Next, courts may believe that
lawyers have nothing to add on particular issues, because the judges can
decide the law for themselves. Furthermore, courts may believe that
many lawyers are not likely to add anything useful because of a
perceived lack of quality.251 Finally, the court may suspect that the
parties ducked the issue for tactical reasons. None of these grounds are
persuasive.
First, in many cases, briefing will sharpen the issue and lead to better
decisions. The adversary process may bring a perspective to legal issues
that the court will miss—no matter how learned the judges are.252
Second, even if the court knows the law better than the parties do, the
parties know the facts better. The results may not be fair to the parties
without their factual input, because that input could affect the choice of
the appropriate legal rule and its application to their case. In addition,
the parties may have presented different evidence if they had known the
issue would be considered. Without such notice, relevant facts may, or
may not, be in the record.253
Third, an issue may have been deliberately waived by a party for tactical
reasons or other proceedings below may have affected the procedural
status of the matter. This may not always be obvious to the appellate
court.254 Requesting supplemental briefs will allow the parties to advise the
court of points in the record that affect the fairness of the result.
Fourth, the court’s actions appear arbitrary if they are not based on the
parties’ briefs. This makes it more difficult for lawyers to advise their clients
as to the likely outcome of cases—making it less likely that cases will
settle. It also makes it more difficult for businesses and individuals to
order their affairs.255
250. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 688–90; id. at 797 &
n.573 (discussing Chief Judge Posner’s view on the perceived crisis in the federal
appellate courts).
251. See id. at 798 (reporting that Chief Judge Posner often expressed the view at
oral argument that the lawyers’ briefs were not very helpful). See also Smith v. Farley,
59 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (“The better lawyers resent this, feeling
that it is ‘unfair’ for judges to do the work of the weaker lawyers.”).
252. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 690; Martineau, supra note
29, at 1038–39; Miller, supra note 22, at 1050.
253. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 685, 690; Martineau, supra
note 29, at 1036–39.
254. For example, the briefs may not note every point that was raised or expressly
waived below.
255. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 685 n.15; Martineau, supra
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Fifth, it is not clear that sua sponte decisions cost the court more time,
because the court may spend less time researching and considering the issue
if it is briefed.256 This point was made by Justice Breyer in Trest v. Cain.257
Sixth, and perhaps most important, parties and counsel may not
perceive the court’s judgment as fair and legitimate unless they get their
say before the court decides.258 As the authors of the leading treatise on
Supreme Court practice have said: “[G]oing beyond the limited
questions and resting decision on grounds not briefed or argued is unfair
to the losing party.”259
Finally, as to judicial efficiency, in the age of e-mail, fax machines,
overnight mail, and telephone conferences, it does not take much extra
time for judges to get together and discuss a case after supplemental
briefing, even if they do not have chambers in the same city. While
courts do have to ration their time, they still need to spend enough time
on each decision to make sure it is right, and that the result is fair.260
That a court would usually reach the same result—even ninety-five
percent or more of the time—without the supplemental briefing does not
answer either the due process question or the issue of whether acting
without supplemental briefing is fair. Trial court judges would probably
reach the same result most of the time without closing argument, or even
without a trial, just on affidavits and a cold record. Our system is based on
an opportunity to be heard before the decision, in most circumstances.
That concept is deeply engrained in litigants as well as in lawyers and
the law.261

note 29, at 1033–34.
256. See Miller, supra note 22, at 1050; Martineau, supra note 29, at 1032.
257. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 29 (1997); see also supra note 222 and
accompanying text (discussion of Trest).
258. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 684–85, 690; Miller, supra
note 22, at 1050 & n.115 (stating that allowing briefing will mitigate concerns caused by
lack of notice); cf. N.Y. Currency Research Corp. v. CFTC, 180 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir.
1999) (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 156 (Crown
Publishers 1984) (“Sentence first—verdict afterwards.”)). This is the point made by the
Supreme Court in Nelson v. Adams USA Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 468 (2000). For a
particularly rabid illustration of this point, see Vincent P. Tassinari, Patent
Compensation Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, 5 J. INTELL. PROP L. 59, 136–53 (1997)
(criticizing allegedly unbriefed dicta in the plurality opinion in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 502–13 (1964)).
259. Cf. STERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 244.
260. See Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 690–91.
261. See Adams, 529 U.S. at 468 n.2.
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C. Supplemental Briefing Does Not Require Either Full Briefing
or Substantial Delay
Full briefs need not always be requested when the court raises a new
issue. The nature of the briefing can vary with the importance of the
issue.262 An appropriate opportunity to respond may be by short
supplemental briefs, letters, or otherwise.263
The Chicago Council of Lawyers suggests the proper course to follow.
Whenever the court (or an individual judge) is considering addressing
significant or potentially dispositive issues, precedents, legal theories,
arguments, or facts not contained in the briefs and the record, the court
should notify the parties and provide them with an opportunity to
address these matters. Examples include the following: (1) Before oral
argument, if the court discovers an issue that the parties can address in
oral argument but have not briefed, the court should send a short written
notice to the parties asking them to prepare the issue for oral argument.
(2) During or after oral argument, if the court discovers an issue that the
parties should address, it should ask the parties to address it in writing.264
The response can be limited in both length and time. For example, an
order directing simultaneous submissions not to exceed five pages
within seven days would be entirely appropriate.265
Raising an issue at oral argument without giving lawyers time to think
and respond is not enough of an opportunity to be heard. While many
courts will allow brief letters or briefs to be filed after argument, lawyers
often aren’t aware of this procedural option, and should be told.
The delay from this procedure would be minimal. Parties can be
asked to brief before or after argument. They can be asked shortly
before argument to address a case at argument. Briefs can be filed
successively or simultaneously.266
262. See Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to
specify the briefing requirement as a per se rule).
263. Many court rules permit parties to file supplemental filings to address new
matters. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28(j) (stating that a party may file a letter with
supplemental authority). Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), has also taught us how
rapidly supplemental briefs can be filed, when necessary.
264. See, e.g., Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1999)
(directing supplemental briefs after oral argument).
265. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 8, at 689. The Council added another
useful point:
In preparing for oral argument, if the court locates a case or statute that it
believes should be addressed by the parties, the court should so notify the
parties prior to oral argument so that counsel can prepare properly. In this
case, a telephone and fax notice should suffice.
Id.
266. One objection to this suggestion is that there will be trouble with drawing lines
between new issues and old issues. Courts have argued in the past about whether issues
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D. Remand Should Be Used when Trial Court Input Would Be Useful
Appellate courts should use remand in lieu of supplemental briefing
whenever trial court or agency input would be useful.267 This can occur
in the following several cases: (1) when the trial court or agency has
already conducted a hearing and decided questions of facts or mixed
questions of fact and law that are affected by the decision, (2) when it
would be unfair to the parties to reach a decision without allowing the
introduction of additional evidence, and (3) any other circumstance
where the appellate court would benefit from the trial court’s decision.
VII. WHEN SHOULD COURTS BE MORE THAN UMPIRES?
It is relatively easy to conclude that courts should give notice and an
opportunity to be heard before deciding issues sua sponte; in most cases
the costs are low and the benefits are high. Ordering supplemental
briefing (or a similar procedure) meets the due process objection to sua
sponte decisions and accommodates many of the concerns raised by the
tension among the adversary process model, the desire to do justice, and
the desire to state rules for future cases.
But ordering supplemental briefing does not resolve all concerns, for it
does not answer when a court should raise a new issue (and order
supplemental briefing) in the first place. Any time an appellate court
steps in, it is acting inconsistently with the adversary process model. Is
it possible to articulate a consistent rationale for doing so?
A. Possible Grounds for Sua Sponte Review
Some commentators believe the answer is never. One commentator
has argued that the Supreme Court should never order rehearing sua
are “new” or were sufficiently raised by the parties. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379–83 (1995) (discussing whether the issue is new); id. at 400–08
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 676–77 (1961); Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366, 1369–71 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (discussing whether the issue is new enough so that due process was violated by
deciding it); Schmalle v. Schmalle, 586 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1998). There will always be
a question of line drawing; there is for every rule. But that does not mean that there
should be no line. Whenever a court is raising an issue so that it is new enough so that
the parties will think it was not previously raised, they should be given an appropriate
opportunity to address the issue.
267. See INS v. Ventura, 123 S. Ct. 353, 354 (2002) (reversing the court of appeals
for failing to remand the case for redetermination by the Board of Immigration Appeals).
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sponte, except in the limited circumstances where a Justice missed the
argument or the Court has changed composition.268 This extreme
position is consistent with the adversary process model, but it fails to
take into account the real, practical, and equitable concerns that lead
courts to act sua sponte.
Professor Martineau argued that appellate courts should allow parties
to raise new issues on appeal only when they involve jurisdiction or in
the same circumstances that they are permitted under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as mistake, inadvertence,
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud. A new issue
should not be raised unless the party could not have raised it at trial. He
suggested that the well-developed body of law and limited reach of these
exceptions would cabin appellate discretion within bounds.269
This narrow scope for sua sponte raising of new issues on appeal
seems too crabbed.270 The Supreme Court and other courts have
responded to the legitimate pull of equity when they have raised issues
sua sponte. The challenge is whether courts (or commentators) can
articulate factors that can provide some guidance to future courts,
lawyers, and litigants as to when new issues should be raised.
Suggesting this challenge is far easier than meeting it. While subject
matter jurisdiction is clearly a proper issue to raise sua sponte,271 it is
difficult to see how any other category can be applied in a neutral
fashion. The following are some examples: First, issues such as comity,
abstention, and federalism are very political to begin with. While it is
possible to argue that a state’s interest in being free from an improper
result is high, state officials should not be allowed to defer raising
defenses, permitting them to gamble on winning on other grounds in the
trial court while counting on the appellate court to save them.272 When
state officials fail to raise these issues or make deliberate concessions,
why should states not be held to deliberate waivers?
Second, an exception for issues of important public interest seems
desirable at first blush, but what is an important public interest to one
court will be unimportant to another. The line will be particularly

268. Krimbel, supra note 27, at 946.
269. Martineau, supra note 29, at 1060; see also Larry A. Klein, Allowing Improper
Argument of Counsel to Be Raised for the First Time on Appeal as Fundamental Error:
Are Florida Courts Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water?, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
97, 124–26 (1998) (following Martineau and arguing that improper jury arguments
should not be raised for the first time on appeal).
270. Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1006 (criticizing Martineau, inter alia, for
focusing on the lawyer and not on the right of the litigant).
271. See Martineau, supra note 29, at 1047.
272. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
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difficult to draw and will often appear nakedly political.273
Third, an exception for issues that are entirely questions of law and
have no factual dispute would allow sua sponte injection of new issues
in many cases. Such an exception, if uniformly applied, may be fair,
enabling courts to ensure that the correct law is applied, as long as
parties had not deliberately waived an issue below.274 If an appellate
court would suggest the correct legal rule and order briefing in every
case that was an option, the parties would likely view the result as more
fair than the current system. But courts would see a significant rise in
their workload.
Fourth, the miscarriage of justice standard is the most open to
manipulation of all.275 Either a court must limit its use to the most rare
cases or it must recognize that it is either changing its method of
appellate review from the adversary process model to the equity model
or it is allowing its judges to exercise unbridled discretion.276
B. Should We Have the Adversary Process Model or an Equity Model?
In the end, the answer to the question of when appellate courts should
be permitted to raise new issues sua sponte may depend on whether
courts accept the arguments made by Dean Roscoe Pound that our
appellate courts should move from the adversary process model to the
concern for justice and truth that underlie the equity model.277 But if one
accepts the premise that writ of error review remains the best model,
appellate courts should be permitted to raise nonjurisdictional matters
273. See Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1001–03.
274. If a deliberate waiver had occurred, that could be raised in the supplemental
briefing.
275. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
276. In addressing the question of when courts should allow parties to raise a new
issue on appeal, a commentator has suggested that courts use a rule to balance the
competing concerns of raising new issues to do justice, the limitations on the ability of
the appellate court to find facts, and the need to prevent lawyers from hiding issues until
appeal. The proposed rule would permit sua sponte consideration either when there is
great public interest or when there was no intentional waiver. No further factual
development of the record is necessary; there was no opportunity to raise the issue below
and there would be no prejudice. Dennerline, supra note 29, at 1011. But this proposal
does not help—the “great public interest” category swallows up the general prohibition
against raising new issues. Further, the parties will almost always have had the
opportunity to raise sua sponte issues in the trial court—the issue is probably coming up
because it is likely that the court’s version of the right answer did not occur to the parties
or the court below.
277. See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 385 (1941).
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sua sponte only in the most exceptional cases, to remedy the gravest
injustices.
If the view were accepted that the equity model fits better with
modern notions of justice and procedure, the adversary process model
would not apply. Instead, appellate courts could raise sua sponte any
legal issue, or even any question, that they thought would lead to the
fair, correct result in the case. The court would then order supplemental
briefing on the issue. One ground to oppose the raising of the new issue
would be waiver; the party opposing the new issue could always assert
that the facts of that case made the application of the waiver rule
appropriate, either because the waiver was deliberate or because any
other result would encourage gamesmanship.278 The court could then
decide whether to address the new issue and reach the proper result.
There is no federal constitutional reason why all state courts must
choose either the adversary process model or an equity model. This may
be a situation where the legal system would benefit by states applying
different models for a period to see how they develop. If the states were
expressly to choose an adversary process model or an equity model for
raising issues sua sponte in civil cases—and stick to it—we would be
able to see whether states can administer the process (either way) fairly
and consistently.279
The author’s preference is for the equity model—even though its
application will involve more work for appellate courts. Hartmann was
wrongly decided280 because the result was unfair, and the court knew it
was unfair. Plaintiffs’ counsel had not engaged in gamesmanship in
choosing issues to waive, the court’s analysis advanced the law, and
there was no reason for the court not to apply the correct rule of law to
the litigants. In the author’s view, appellate courts should be more free
in suggesting that parties rebrief or reargue an issue that will lead to the
correct result when fact situations squarely present unbriefed issues.
From the lawyers’ side of the bench, the extra work that will be required
for appellate courts to order and review supplemental briefing seems
worth the increased number of correct, fair results.

278. Cf. Dennerline, supra note 29, at 989–90 (arguing that a lawyer who did not
know of an issue below should be treated differently than a lawyer who intentionally
concealed the issue).
279. This Article does not attempt to catalog the state statutes that may affect the
right of a court to reach new issues sua sponte on appeal. For such a listing, see
generally Campbell, supra note 29.
280. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers and judges disagree on whether courts should take an activist
stance towards raising new issues sua sponte. But whichever stance a
court chooses, the key is consistency. “The only consistent feature of
the current system is its inconsistency.”281 Spouting the general rule in
some cases and the gorilla rule in others cannot be the correct answer.
That is not a system of law; it is too close to a game of chance.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled for decades with
the tension between following rules and doing justice. They have failed
to articulate a meaningful standard for when courts should depart from
the waiver rules of the adversary process model to raise new issues sua
sponte.
Justice Harlan’s words in Mapp v. Ohio still carry force:
The occasion which the Court has taken here is in the context of a case where
the question was briefed not at all and argued only extremely tangentially. The
unwisdom of overruling Wolf without full-dress argument is aggravated by the
circumstance that that decision is a comparatively recent one . . . . I would think
that our obligation to the States, on whom we impose this new rule, as well as
the obligation of orderly adherence to our own processes would demand that we
seek that aid which adequate briefing and argument leads to the determination
of an important issue. . . .
Thus, if the Court were bent on reconsidering Wolf, I think that there would
soon have presented itself an appropriate opportunity in which we could have
had the benefit of full briefing and argument. In any event, at the very least, the
present case should have been set down for reargument, in view of the
inadequate briefing and argument we have received on the Wolf point. To all
intents and purposes the court’s present action amounts to a summary reversal
of Wolf, without argument.
I am bound to say that what has been done is not likely to promote respect
either for the Court’s adjudicatory process or for the stability of its decisions.282

Were Erie Railroad Co., Mapp, Washington v. Davis, Younger, and
Batson wrongly decided on the merits? That is in the eye of the
beholder. Would any of those decisions have been seen as less of an
exercise of judicial will if the issues had been briefed before they were
decided? Possibly. Would counsel and the parties have thought their
cases received a fairer shake if the cases were decided on grounds they
had been given a chance to brief? That seems likely. Are parties
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before decision? The
281. Martineau, supra note 29, at 1061.
282. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676–77 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
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answer should be “yes” from appellate courts, just as it is for other
decisionmakers.
The tension between law and equity, between procedural rules and
doing justice, will always be with us. So will the tension between doing
justice for the parties and stating rules that will guide future conduct.
But those tensions can be lessened by always giving parties notice and
an opportunity to be heard before a court decides an issue. Due process
should require it; simple fairness already does.
Notice and an opportunity to be heard before deciding a case sua
sponte does not resolve the question of when a court should raise an
issue sua sponte—it just makes the unequal application of waiver more
fair to the litigants (and increases the accuracy of the decisionmaking
process in some cases). But courts should pay more attention to
articulating and following a consistent series of rules for when they will
intervene in the adversary process.
The gorilla rule may be fine in the jungle. But it does little to create
respect for law in the courthouse. It is time to use process to tame the
gorilla.
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